Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations by Zsolt Spéder & Ferenc Kamarás
Demographic Research   a free, expedited, online journal 
of peer-reviewed research and commentary  
in the population sciences published by the  
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 







DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH  
 
VOLUME 19, ARTICLE 18, PAGES 599-664 
PUBLISHED 01 JULY 2008 
http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/18/ 
DOI:  10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.18 
 
Research Article  
 
Hungary: 
Secular fertility decline with  






This publication is part of Special Collection 7: Childbearing Trends and 
Policies in Europe (http://www.demographic-research.org/special/7/)   
 
© 2008 Spéder & Kamarás.  
 
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use, reproduction & distribution in  any medium 
for non-commercial purposes,  provided the original author(s) and source are given credit.  
See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/ 
 
 Table of Contents 
  1  Introduction  600 
     
2  Fertility  603 
2.1  Fertility trends  603 
2.2  The mean age of mothers at birth  605 
2.3  Age-specific fertility  607 
2.4  Fertility by parity  608 
2.5  Romany population  610 
2.6  Postponement or pattern change?  611 
     
3  Birth control  614 
3.1  Induced abortion  614 
3.2  Contraception  618 
     
4  Fundamental changes in partnership relations  619 
4.1  Development of marriages  619 
4.2  The spread of cohabitation  622 
4.3  Childbirth propensity in marriage and cohabitation  625 
4.4  Extramarital births  626 
4.5  Divorce, stability of partnerships  629 
     
5  Social, structural and institutional environment for childbearing  631 
5.1  Education  632 
5.2  Labour market  634 
     
6  Values and attitudes  641 
6.1  Ideational factors affecting childbearing in present-day Hungary 
(effects in micro-models) 
641 
6.2  Selected features of value changes in Hungary (macro-level 
associations) 
642 
6.3  Maturation of values or the spread of new values?  646 
     
7  Population and family policies  647 
7.1  Population policy measures  647 
7.2  Evaluation and demographic effects of population policy measures  651 
     
8  Phases of transformation. An attempt to segment fertility 
development in Hungary 
654 
8.1  1967–1985: The period of active population policy  654 
8.2  1985–1990: incubation of the alternative family mode(s)  655 
8.3  1990–1995: the period of institutional vacuum and anomie  655 
8.4  1995–    : Pattern change: adaptation to new social circumstances  658 
     
  References  660 
     Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18  
research article  
http://www.demographic-research.org   599 
Hungary: 






In this study, we demonstrate from different angles that Hungarian fertility basically 
decreased between 1965 and 2005, but also clearly fluctuated, and showed different 
patterns in the different periods within this epoch. As a result, the clear communist-era 
family pattern of “early marriage and childbearing with two children” was replaced, but 
new family model(s) have not yet fully emerged. We could show that profound changes 
in partnership behaviour –divorce and cohabitation– started before the change of the 
political regime, but also that changes in partnership relations accelerated after 1990, 
and that partnerships have become more fragile. In addition, Western-style values of 
“empty individualism” and consumerism were clearly present under socialism, but their 
motivating  force  was  tamed  by  the  communist  system,  in  which  population  policy 
played  a  significant  role.  Of  these  institutional  changes,  we  ascribe  the  greatest 
importance to the expansion in the educational system and the changes in the labour 
market.  We  show  that,  following  the  changes  in  the  economic  system,  the  conflict 
between family and work intensified. The synchronic consideration of values, labour 
market relations, economic development, and population policy; and the relationship of 
these factors to fertility and nuptiality trends, enabled us to formulate a developmental 
scheme of four phases concerning the evolution of fertility since 1965.  
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1. Introduction   
Over the past century, Hungary went from having an essentially growing population 
with a balanced age composition, to having a population that was gradually aging, and 
then declining. Population numbers almost doubled within a century, from 5.3 million 
in 1880, and reached a maximum of 10,709,000 people in 1980. Population size has 
been decreasing steadily since then, albeit with varying levels of intensity, falling to 
10,066,000 at the beginning of 2007. This represents a decrease of about 650,000 (6%) 
over a quarter of a century. 
The  fluctuating,  but  basically  declining  fertility  trend  and  the  high  level  of 
morbidity may have also played a role in the early appearance of natural population 
decrease, which can be regarded as early even in a European comparison. The period 
total fertility rate (PTFR) dropped below the replacement level as early as the end of the 
1950s,  and  in  the  first  half  of  the  1960s,  when  most  European  countries  were 
experiencing a “baby boom,” the Hungarian total fertility rate fell below 1.8, a uniquely 
low value even on a global scale. The improving trend of mortality after the Second 
World War came to a halt in the mid-1960s. During the “epidemiological crisis” of the 
following  decades,  life  expectancy  at  birth  for  women  increased  a  little,  though 
intermittently, while life expectancy among men decreased significantly, and did not 
reach and exceed the level of three and a half decades earlier until the early years of the 
new millennium. 
Consequently, it was not accidental that population decline – or, more precisely, 
the problem of low fertility – often became the subject of social debates in Hungary.
3 
There was a perceptible degree of public awareness of the issue, and concerns about 
population decline resulted in political action after the mid-1960s. The appearance of 
low  fertility  relative  to  other  European  countries  no  doubt  contributed  to  increased 
awareness of population related issues, as did the fact that the re-drawing of the borders 
of  Hungary  after  the  two  world  wars  radically  reduced  the  country’s  territory,  and 
millions  of  members  of  Hungarian  communities  became  disconnected  from  their 
homeland and citizenship. Since the end of the 1960s, politicians have been formulating 
population  goals,  framing  and  initiating  population  measures  cyclically,  and  in  an 
incoherent fashion. However, it would be hard to claim that the problem of low fertility 
has been continuously at the centre of political action.  
                                                            
3 Considering important social issues before the second World War does not belong to the objectives of the 
present paper; however, it is worth noting that the assumed diffusion of “singletons” (the system of having 
only one child in a family) as a sign of a declining nation, and as a reason for the shrinking population, was 
continuously kept on the agenda by a group of progressive intellectuals between the two world wars (see, e.g., 
Fülep, 1929, Ilyés, 1933). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Population  measures  that  evolved  in  the  second  half  of  the  1960s,  and  that 
intensified further in the 1970s, temporarily halted the decline in fertility, and even 
resulted in fertility above the replacement level for a few years. The 1.8 value of PTFR 
that characterised the 1980s was above the European average, but it was not sufficient 
to compensate for the effects that the high level of mortality had on population decline. 
While the role of governmental measures – presented in detail in Section 7 – has 
hardly  been  negligible  in  the  development  of  Hungarian  fertility  over  the  last  half 
century, the change in the political and economic system
4 starting in 1989–1990 had a 
major role in the basic transformation of fertility conditions, and in fertility pattern 
change, as was the case in other ex-communist countries. These changes have created 
radically new conditions for everyday action, altered the system of opportunities for 
individual behaviours, and the ranking of preferences. Obviously, the circumstances of 
fertility choices and life course decisions were modified as well. In order to understand 
the shifts in fertility around the change of the political regime, we provide an overview 
of selected facets of economic transformation in detail, and compare the operation of 
the labour market before and after 1990, and its relation to childbearing. In addition, we 
discuss the potential effects of sudden changes in the supply of consumer goods on the 
desire to have children, and take into consideration the effects of educational expansion 
on the life course (Section 5). 
Value orientations and attitudes play key roles in modern societies as individuals 
choose among socially available options related to shaping and ordering the course of 
their lives, including choices about whether or not they have children, when they have 
children,  and  how  many  children  they  have.  Obviously,  values  not  only  affect 
individual decisions about childbirth; rather, there are a number of choices that narrow, 
widen or rearrange the conditions of childbearing. It is, therefore, necessary to identify 
when  and  what  kind  of  shifts  took  place  in  this  over  the  last  quarter  of  a  century 
(Section 6). A systematic overview of the trends in values and attitudes is impossible 
because we lack a standard instrument for the measurement of values, and because 
surveys of values are quite rare. Based on available surveys, we may be positive that 
value  changes  were  not  triggered  by  the  change  of  political  regime  in  Hungary,  a 
country which may have been regarded alongside Yugoslavia as the most open among 
the former socialist countries from the mid 1960s (“the happiest barrack,” as it was 
often called by journalists). 
Owing  to  the  change  of  political  regime,  the  new  structural  conditions,  the 
diffusion of values, and the impact of these values on the new set of circumstances, the 
ever-changing system of institutions of family and population policy encouraged and 
made the emergence of a new fertility pattern possible. In line with European trends, 
                                                            
4 For a detailed discussion about the social, political and economic transition, see the volume of Admaski, et 
al., 2002, and the paper of Spéder, et al. 2002 about Hungary in the same volume. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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childbirth has shifted to a higher age, and the number of extramarital births continues to 
grow. There are signs indicating that, not only the postponement of childbirth, but also 
a substantial differentiation of fertility behaviour is taking place; i.e., that new patterns 
of childbearing are emerging. This still incomplete pattern change led to the decrease in 
the level of fertility of 40% in the 1990s, and the level has remained unchanged at 
around 1.3 since 1997. 
The starting point of our analysis is the accurate documentation and analysis of 
fertility trends (Section 2). It is essentially based on the analysis of vital statistics data 
and the fertility database that Kamarás has compiled from the data (KSH 1996, KSH 
2006a). Survey data are only used as a complement to this analysis. The analysis of 
birth control (Section 3) also partly rests on the available vital statistic data, but is 
largely based on the results of special cohort analysis of induced abortions (KSH 2007). 
Unfortunately, survey data on the practice of contraception are only available from an 
earlier period, and for a population with limited representativeness. 
We have also devoted ample space to the presentation of partnership trends, about 
which the data of the Hungarian Generation and Gender Survey (HGGS), the so-called 
“Turning points of the Life Course”
5 provide indispensable information (Section 4). 
Hungary,  on  the  verge  of  the  Hajnal  line  (Hajnal,  1965),  was  characterised  by  the 
general practice of early marriage until the 1980s. This behaviour pattern started to 
change in the 1980s, and it has been fundamentally transformed over the past 15 years. 
The values of total first marriage rate (TFMR), around 0.8–0.9 during the 1970s–1980s, 
was almost halved in the 1990s, and has remained stuck at around 0.45 in recent years. 
With the aid of HGGS data, we are able to track the spread of cohabitations, which have 
become dominant in the establishment of first unions. Importantly, cohabitating unions 
are  less  stable  than  marriages;  consequently,  they  certainly  reduce  the  childbearing 
propensity of couples living in partnership. 
In  the  concluding  section  of  our  chapter,  we  attempt  to  periodise  fertility 
tendencies of the last 50 years (Section 8). In general, we agree with those who claim 
that the change of political regime marks a sharp break in fertility trends in former 
socialist countries (Sobotka, et al. 2003). At the same time, the analysis of data on 
fertility and nuptiality, taking social structural conditions into consideration, as well as 
the identification of value changes and the overview of political measures, motivated us 
to segment the fertility conditions of the last half century into four separate phases. We 
suppose that, during state socialism, the long period of active population policy, the 
seeds of alternative family formations had already appeared, and then disembogued into 
an incubation period. The development of the characteristic fertility behaviour under 
the new, stabilised socio-economic regime (which is often manifested by a shift towards 
later timing of childbearing, commonly labelled as ‘postponement’) was preceded by a 
                                                            
5 For more information about the concept of the survey see, Spéder 2001. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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period of institutional vacuum/anomie,
6 when routine and non-conformist behaviours 
coexisted.  Numerous  characteristics  of  the  new  childbearing  practice  manifest 
themselves in the fourth transformation phase; however, we think that fertility pattern 
change has not yet reached its end. 
 
 
2. Fertility  
2.1 Fertility trends  
The Hungarian fertility of past decades is characterised by a strongly fluctuating, but 
basically  decreasing  trend.  The  secular  decreasing  trend  could  be  attributed  to  the 
longstanding fertility transition and, arguably, to the two fundamental political regime 
changes  during  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century:  to  the  ‘introduction’  of 
communism after the Second World War, and to the political transformation to the 
market economy at the end of the century. The considerable fluctuations in fertility, 
apparent in the repeating pattern of peaks followed by troughs, are largely the result of 
social policy endeavours aimed at affecting and changing the basically decreasing trend 
by applying “external” means, sometimes in the form of restrictions (prohibition of 
abortion), and sometimes using incentive measures.  
Hungary  was  the  first  European  country  in  which  the  period  total  fertility  fell 
below the replacement level following the Second World War, and, except for a four-
year period, fertility has remained below replacement level for the last 50 years. The 
baby  boom  of  the  mid-1950s  was  mainly  the  outcome  of  the  strict  prohibition  on 
abortion that lasted for a few years; however, after this period, the level of fertility 
decreased by 40% between 1954 and 1962, and the total period fertility rate (PTFR) of 
below 1.8 at the beginning of 1960s was, alongside Estonia, the lowest in the world. 
Policy measures, which resulted in a sudden but temporary increase in fertility rates, 
contributed to the comparatively large size of the baby boom birth cohorts of the mid-
1970s.
7  The  PTFR  of  around  1.8  of  the  1980s,  however,  fell  behind  governmental 
expectations and goals, but it was above average in a European comparison. From the 
beginning of the 1990s onwards, there was a significant and permanent drop from this 
level. Principally, the phenomenon of 35 years ago was repeated: namely, the level of 
PTFR decreased by 40% within eight years. The PTFR sank below the ‘lowest-low’ 
                                                            
6 We agree that rising anomie was important for fertility decisions, as emphasised by Philipov (e.g., Philipov 
et al. 2006), however, we suppose that this role was only valid for one particular period of the transition from 
communism to the market economy. Since post-communist countries have not gone through the same routes 
of transition, the role and content of anomie, and its duration may differ in them. 
7 Details of the population policy measures introduced in 1973 are discussed in Section 7. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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level of 1.3. In the new millennium, a slow but hesitant move was perceptible from this 
historical nadir that resulted in a PTFR of 1.35 in 2006 (Figure 1.) 
 







































Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. Completed cohort TFR: Census 1970 for birth cohorts 1917–1921; 
Fertility database for birth cohort 1921–1970. 
Note: The time lag between the period TFR and cohort TFR is 30 years. Cohort TFR for birth cohorts 1960 through 1970 until the 
age reached in 2006.  
 
 
There is no sign of strong fluctuations in the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR), but 
the fundamental trend of fertility decrease is interrupted by a slight upward trend among 
the generation born around 1960. Female generations born during the First World War 
completed  their  fertility  at  around  2.2  children  per  woman;  however,  cohorts  born 
between 1940 and 1944 completed it at a lower level. The difference is 15%, which can 
be  considered  significant,  but  which  does  not  even  approximate  the  fluctuations  of 
period fertility. It is noteworthy that the CTFR stabilised among generations born after 
the Second World War, and that a small increase was perceived among cohorts born at 
the beginning of the 1960s. The profound change in fertility pattern manifests itself first 
among generations born at the end of the 1960s. There seems to be significant fall in 
cumulated fertility of younger cohorts across their childbearing ages which may not be 
overcome in the near future, and thus a further decline in their completed TFR can be 
envisioned. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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2.2 The mean age of mothers at birth  
For a long period, Hungarian fertility was characterised by entry into motherhood at a 
young age. During the previous century, the decrease in fertility was accompanied by 
mothers becoming younger; after the number of higher-order births started to fall, the 
ratio of families with four, five, or more children declined radically. The mean age of 
mothers at birth was under 25 years in the 1970s: their first child was born when they 
were 22–23 years old, and on average, they gave birth to their second child before 
turning 26. The dual earner family with two children became the general model, which 
meant that women and couples basically realised their planned family size by the end of 
their twenties. The fertility of teenagers was high, and the most frequent age of mothers 
at birth was between 20 and 24 years. The fertility of women under 25 years of age 
amounted to 60% of the total period fertility rate, while the fertility of women under age 
30 numbered 85% of PTFR. 
The signs of change were already apparent in the 1980s, but became explicit from 
the  mid-1990s  onwards.  The  new  phenomenon  of  delayed  motherhood  set  in  and 
gradually rose in prominence. This trend, in turn, negatively affected period fertility 
rates for the first time. Whereas during the 20 years between 1975 and 1995, the mean 
age of mothers at birth increased by only slightly more than one year, it rose by nearly 
three years during the following decade. The lower the birth order of the child, the 
higher the increase in the mean age; in other words, the birth of the first and second 
child at a later age plays the most significant role in the increase in the mean age of 
mothers. In 2006, the mean age of mothers at the birth of their first child was 27.3 
years; at the birth of the second child, the mean age was 29.5 years. Compared to the 
mid-1990s, these ages represent increases of four and three years, respectively (Figure 
2.) 
With the rise in the mean age at childbirth, the role that particular age groups 
played  in  the  annual  births  and  their  contribution  to  the  total  period  fertility  rate 
changed significantly. Since the second half of the 1970s, the fertility of teenagers has 
fallen by almost 75%; meanwhile over the past 15 years, the fertility of those between 
20 and 24 years of age, formerly the most fertile age group, has decreased by more than 
66%. These changes were accompanied by the fact that childbearing of women under 
25 lost its determining importance in period fertility. Until the beginning of the 1990s, 
the fertility of women under 25 contributed to more than half of PTFR; however, this 
age group only contributed one-quarter of PTFR in 2006. (Figure 3) In other words, the 
remarkable  decline  in  fertility  in  the  1990s  was  almost  exclusively  due  to  the 
significantly decreasing childbearing rates of younger age groups. It is not yet clear to 
what extent this trend is due to planned strategy – namely, to the postponement of 
childbearing, or to the decision not to have children. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Fraction of period total fertility rate contributed by age  
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Source: Authors’ computation based on vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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2.3 Age-specific fertility  
Despite the strong oscillations of period fertility, there was no fundamental change in 
the age-specific profile of fertility until the 1990s: at  times  when  fertility  suddenly 
increased or dropped, this shift was manifested across all childbearing ages. The first 
signs of change may be perceived in the age-specific distribution of 1990; later, the 
profile  of  the  curve  radically  changes,  increasingly  resembling  normal  distribution. 
Parallel to the rapid decrease in fertility, the modal age shifts to an increasingly later 
age: in 2000, childbirth was most frequent at the age of 27; while in 2006, most mothers 
were  29  years  old.  The  fertility  curve  for  2006  already  showed  signs  of  the 
‘recuperation’ of births that, presumably, had been delayed at younger ages. The rise in 
fertility  in  2006  is  chiefly  due  to  the  more  frequent  childbirth  of  women  over  30, 
whereas the fertility of women under 25 further decreases (Figure 4). The future level 
of fertility will be determined by the extent to which the more frequent births by women 
over 30 compensate for the ‘missing births’ among young generations.  
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Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
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2.4 Fertility by parity  
By breaking down period total fertility rate (PTFR) by birth order, we get an idea of 
what role different birth orders played in the decade-long fluctuation of fertility (Figure 
5). The increase of fertility that commenced in the second part of the 1960s and reached 
its peak in the  mid-1970s  was primarily due to the  more frequent births of second 
children, whose share increased from 30% to 40% between 1965 and 1975. In addition, 
advancement of second births due to policy measures in 1973 could contribute to the 
increasing share of second births. The drop of the 1990s is primarily attributable to the 
decreasing rate of second children, while the slow increase of fertility in recent years is 
largely due to the increasing rate of first children. It seems that the socio-economic 
change of the last fifteen years had less influence on third or higher-order children. 
Their share rose from 15% to 24% between 1980 and 1994; it soon decreased again, but 
their present share is still slightly higher than it was at the beginning of the 1990s. 
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Source: Authors’ computation based on vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
 
 
The picture is more nuanced when we look at parity progression ratios (PPRs) by 
birth cohorts. We are able to examine PPRs and completed fertility for the cohorts born 
between  1918  and  1965.  The  probability  of  the  birth  of  a  first  child  for  childless 
women, a0, shows a slow but constant increase, and surpasses 0.9 for each cohort born 
after 1936. The first signs of decrease may be perceived among cohorts born after 1960. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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The  probability  of  a  second  child’s  birth,  a1,  starts  to  rise  dynamically  among 
generations born after the Second World War, and its value reaches a maximum of 
close  to  0.8  among  cohorts  born  after  1950.  These  generations  gave  birth  to  their 
children  mostly  during  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  period when  the  two-child  family 
model  became  the  norm.  The  probability  of  the  birth  of  higher-order  children  had 
rapidly  decreased  among  women  born  in  the  1920s–1940s.  Then,  after  a  period  of 
stagnation, a slow but steady rise in higher-order birth rates was seen among cohorts 
born in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Thus, the previous 
decreasing trend of completed cohort fertility came to a halt and rose slightly among 
these generations because a0 and a1 were relatively high and stable, and because the 
third- and fourth-birth progression rates were rising (Figure 6). 
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Source: Authors’ computation based on census and fertility data. PPRs: Census 1970 (for birth cohorts 1918–1921); Fertility 
database (for birth cohort 1921–1965).KSH 2006a. 
 
 
Over time, the two-child family type became more and more dominant, alongside 
the decreasing proportion of childless women, women with one child, and women with 
four or more children. More than half of the female generations born in the 1950s gave 
birth to two children when completing their fertility, and the proportion of childless 
women decreased to 7%–8%, a low point that had never before been reached(Figure 7). 
The composition by number of children starts to polarise among cohorts born in the 
1960s, while the direction and dynamics of change becomes more and more overt in the Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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case of generations born in the 1970s. Essentially, the change indicates that the two-
child family loses part of its previous hegemony, the proportion of childless and one-
child families increased significantly, and at the same time, the share of families with 
three or more children stabilises. 
 
Figure 7:  Percentage distribution of women by final number of children,  
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Source: Authors’ computation based on fertility database. KSH, 1996, KSH, 2006. 
 
 
2.5 Romany population  
Future  trends  of  fertility  may  become  increasingly  affected  by  the  demographic 
behaviour of the Romany population, because their share in the population of Hungary 
is growing dynamically.
8 According to the estimates, in 2003, at the time of the second 
representative Roma survey, 569,000 Romany lived in Hungary. Their age composition 
is considerably  younger than that of the total Hungarian  population (see Hablicsek, 
2007). While 16.1% of the Hungarian population was under 15 years of age in 2003, the 
                                                            
8 It is necessary to mention that identification of the Roma ethnicity is not an easy task. No full consensus has 
yet been reached concerning the question of “who can be regarded as Roma.” The population size resulting 
from self-identification and of identification by the “local community” are far apart. Censuses use self-
definition for identification, and arrive at the half of the population estimated by experts based on surveys and 
school district data (Hablicsek, 2007, Szelényi, Ladányi, 2006).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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corresponding estimated figure was 34.1% in the Roma population. Besides censuses, 
Hablicsek used the above-mentioned Roma surveys and the HGGS for the projection of 
the Romany population and the description of their fertility behaviour. According to his 
estimates, total fertility rate was 3.12 in the Roma population between 1990 and 2000, 
and the available data indicated a declining tendency (it dropped from 3.29 to 3.00 
during the 1990s). However, Hablicsek draws our attention to the fact that Romany 
fertility shows considerable regional variation. An analysis conducted by Durst tends to 
confirm  these  results:  she  describes  in  detail  the  situation  of  a  “ghettoising”  Roma 
community, in which the mean age at first childbirth has declined and childbearing 
propensity has increased due to the intensification of school segregation (Durst, 2006). 
Supposedly,  the  fertility  of  the  Roma  population  is  strongly  connected  to  the 
circumstances of integration: integration into the non-Romany community involves the 
convergence of fertility practices, while segregation brings divergence. 
 
 
2.6 Postponement or pattern change?  
The fertility behaviours and practices of today’s young and middle-aged generations 
basically differ from those of their parents. The different childbearing strategies of the 
generations of parents and children become overt when comparing cohort age-specific 
fertility rates by parity. Their cumulated values indicate what proportion of women of 
different cohorts gave birth to their first, second, or third children up to a given age 
(Figures 8 and 9). 
The most obvious trend is that there is no essential difference in the childbearing 
strategies of the generations born between 1955 and 1965. Women of these cohorts 
gave birth to first and second children at high rates and at young ages: by the age of 30, 
80% of them had given birth to their first child, and 60% of them had had their second 
child. There is no significant difference in the average number of children they had at 
age 40. Women born in 1970 and thereafter began to give birth to their first and second 
children at later ages, and were making up for lost time when they reached their late 
twenties and thirties. The extent of this ‘recuperation’ largely depends on fertility trends 
in the upcoming years.  
A significant transformation in the age pattern of childbearing may be observed 
among the populous generations born in the mid-1970s, and among younger cohorts 
who are already of childbearing age. Lags among these cohorts in the rates of first and 
second births until the age of 25 or 30 are so considerable that there appears to be no 
realistic chance that they will completely ‘catch up’. Women born in 1975, compared to 
the five-year older cohort of 1970, reduced their lag until they reached 30, but there is  
 Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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Figure 8:  Cumulative first births per woman and cumulative absolute change  
by age, selected birth cohort (benchmark cohort 1955) (Proportion of 
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Source: Authors’ computation based on fertility database. KSH, 1996, KSH, 2006a. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Figure 9:  Cumulative second births per woman and cumulative absolute change  
by age, selected birth cohort (benchmark cohort 1955) (Proportion of 
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Source: Authors’ computation based on fertility database. KSH, 1996, KSH, 2006. 
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still a very significant difference in the rates of first and second births, not to mention a 
sizeable decrease compared to the “benchmark” generation born in 1955. The younger 
the generation, the more it lags behind the reference cohort in the number of children at 
younger  ages.  This  may  be  seen  as  birth  postponement,  and  a  full  recuperation  of 
postponed births is not yet out of the question, but the extent of the lag is so great that it 
hints at an intentional or unintentional decline in completed cohort fertility.  
 
 
3. Birth control  
At the beginning of the 20th century, a Hungarian woman had an average of about 7.0 
pregnancies  during  the  course  of  her  lifetime,  whereas,  in  2006,  the  period  total 
pregnancy rate (PTPR) was only 2.24. Of this figure, live births amounted to 1.35, 
induced abortion to 0.65, and 0.24 was attributable to other foetal loss. The practice of 
induced  abortion  and  contraception  played  an  ever-changing  role  in  fuelling  the 
decrease in the number of pregnancies and the termination of unwanted pregnancies.  
 
 
3.1 Induced abortion  
In  Hungary,  the  50-year-old  history  of  the  authorisation  of  induced  abortion  is 
characterised  by  diverse  regulatory  practices,  from  strict  prohibition  to  total 
liberalisation.  A  strict  ban  on  abortion  took  effect  in  1953  and  the  participating 
physicians and midwives were sent to prison. This abortion ban aimed at halting the 
decrease  in  births  that  began  in  the  early  1950s.  However,  from  1956,  a  totally 
liberalised  practice  was  introduced,  which  was  based  on  the  Soviet  example  and 
permitted abortion practically without limitations, upon demand. As one element of the 
population-related  measures  of  1973,  the  authorisation  process  was  re-introduced:  a 
committee made the decision, taking into consideration the age, family status, number 
of children, social and financial circumstances, and health of the woman. The Foetus 
Protection Act of 1992 introduced a legal provision to the authorisation process, which 
had previously been regulated by a ministerial decree. According to this law, which is 
still in effect, permission is granted only if the health of the mother or the foetus is in 
danger, if the pregnancy is the result of criminal act, or if the woman is in a severe crisis 
situation. This regulation did not, however, modify access to abortion in practice. At 
present, a severe crisis situation is named as the reason for an abortion in 96%–98% of 
cases. 
From the second half of the 1950s, the number of induced abortions rose rapidly, 
and between 1959 and 1973 it exceeded the total number of births. Period total induced Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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abortion rate (PTIAR) reached its maximum with 2.78 at the end of the 1960s. The 
subsequent decrease was partly attributable to the introduction and a rapid spread of 
modern birth control pills that appeared in Hungary at the end of the 1960s. The 40% 
drop in 1974 is mostly due to population-related measures coming into effect, which, 
besides reintroducing the authorization of induced abortions, included several measures 
to encourage childbirth, further expanded the availability of modern birth control pills, 
and made the conditions of access easier. The value of PTIAR reached a low of 1.03 at 
the beginning of the 1980s, and then started to increase again. The introduction of the 
Foetus Protection Act brought an almost 15% decrease in 1993, and a further 40% drop 
took place over the next 10 years. As a result, PTIAR per one woman was 0.64 in 2006 
(Figure 10). 
The induced abortion practice of particular cohorts can be tracked until the end of 
their fertile life periods for generations born between 1925 and 1964, and, in the case of 
younger cohorts, until the age reached on January 1, 2007. The results indicate that the 
highest  number  of  abortions  was  carried  out  during  the  lives  of  generations  born 
between 1935 and 1944. During the period of strict abortion prohibition in 1953–1955, 
these generations were too young to be influenced by the ban; however, they were at the 
zenith of their childbearing age during the time of free abortion choice. Due to the lack 
of modern contraceptive methods, induced abortion became the chief means of birth 
control.  Consequently,  these  cohorts  had  more  abortions  than  live  births.  A  clear 
decreasing  trend  may  only  be  perceived  among  generations  born  after  the  Second 
World War. The value of the cohort total induced abortion rate (CTIAR) decreased 
continuously, albeit unevenly, among cohorts born after the second half of the 1940s. 
All in all, the value of CTIAR dropped to nearly one-third, from 2.14 to 0.74, among 
cohorts born between 1935 and 1965. 
The decrease of cohort abortion rates is primarily due to the drop in the rate of 
repeated  induced  abortions.  The  ratio  of  women  having  two  or  more  abortions 
decreased from 50% to 21% among cohorts born between 1935 and 1965. 
The trends of parity progression ratios for induced abortion demonstrate that the 
value of a0 rose above 0.8 for the cohorts born during the Second World War, and then 
gradually  decreased.  The  values  of  induced  abortions  at  higher  parity  were  highest 
among  the  cohorts  born  in  the  1930s,  and  then  markedly  decreased.  However,  the 
downward trend slowed and then halted among cohorts born in the 1960s. This means 
that the ratio of women with repeated abortions was still high among these generations 
(Figure 11). 
The age-specific curve of induced abortions shows no significant change between 
1975 and 1990. Abortion is most frequent among women in their twenties, but it is also 
high and demonstrates an increasing trend among teenagers. A decline began in the 
mid-1990s, and it became more and more definite in the subsequent 10 years. The age-Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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specific curve of 2006 shows a significant decrease in all age groups, compared to the 
rates of 1990 or 2000. The most noteworthy decline occurred among teenagers, who are 
most exposed to the harmful influences of induced abortions (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 10:  Period (1957–2006) and cohort (1925–1969) total induced  































Source: Authors’ computation based on vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. Cohort TIAR: Induced abortions HCSO 
2000, for birth cohorts 1925–1954, and induced abortions HCSO 2007, for birth cohort 1955–1969   
Note: The time lag between the period TIAR and cohort TIAR is 30 years. Cohort TIAR for birth cohorts 1960 through 1969 until the 
age reached in 2006.  
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Figure 11:  Parity progression ratios to induced abortions among  
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Source: Authors’ computation based on Induced abortions HCSO 2000, for birth cohorts 1925–1954, and Induced abortions HCSO 
2007, for birth cohort 1955–1969. 
 




























































Source: Authors’ computation based on vital statistics data, Induced abortions HCSO 2007. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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3.2 Contraception  
Using various types of representative surveys, the birth control practices of Hungarian 
women may be traced from the end of the 1950s. In this period, effective contraception 
was not accessible; therefore the 1950s and 1960s are characterised by the dominance 
of traditional means of birth control, especially coitus interruptus. A significant change 
took place in the second part of the 1960s, when the first oral contraceptive pills were 
introduced. Their use spread rapidly, and the selection also expanded from the 1970s. 
Starting in the first half of 1980s, six types of oral contraceptives were accessible. The 
use  of  intrauterine  devices  accelerated  from  the  mid-1970s  onwards,  and  since  the 
1980s, it is the most frequently utilised contraceptive method besides the pill (Table 1).  
 
Table 1:  Women living in partnership by main method of contraception  
  (1958–1993)  
 







Withdrawal  52.0  63.0  23.0  11.0  8.0 
Periodic abstinence  7.0  4.0  4.0  3.0  3.0 
Condom  21.0  17.0  5.0  5.0  11.0 
IUD  –  0.0  13.0  26.0  24.0 
Pill  –  0.0  49.0  54.0  52.0 
Other methods  20.0  16.0  6.0  1.0  2.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
           
Of 100 women            
Users  59.0  67.0  72.0  73.0  73.0 
Non users  41.0  33.0  28.0  27.0  27.0 
 
Source: Fertility differentials, family planning practice and birth control behaviours 1966–1986 HCSO 1989, FFS Survey Standard 
Country Report Hungary UN 1999.  
a/ Married women aged 15–39 years. 
b/ Women living in partnership aged 18–41 years. 
 
The method of contraception is differentiated by age. Women prefer oral pills until 
the  end  of  their  thirties;  the  pill  constitutes  the  most  frequently  used  contraceptive 
method in all age groups. As women grow older, the rate of intrauterine devices (IUD) 
increases and the proportion of women using the pill decreases. The condom is not 
among the popular contraceptive methods in Hungary. While the condom is the second 
most frequently used method among women under age 25, its usage rate is barely one-
fifth of that of the pill. Similarly, the ratio of women who use traditional methods is Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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also  low.  The  majority  of  young  women  who  use  no  contraception  methods  are 
pregnant or want to have a child; however, the ratio of infecund women increases at 
higher reproductive ages. Contraceptive sterilisation is relatively rare in Hungary, and it 
has been permitted only above a certain age and number of children. Under a new law 
introduced  in  2007,  women  over  age  18  would  have  the  constitutional  right  to  use 
contraceptive sterilisation.  
 
 
4. Fundamental changes in partnership relations  
In  recent  decades,  fundamental  changes  have  taken  place  in  partnership  relations: 
cohabitation  has become  widespread, the popularity of  marriage has decreased, and 
timing of partnerships and marriage over the life course, as well as the dissolubility of 
partnerships, have changed. Almost no aspect of partnerships has remained intact. (see 
Carlson–Klinger,  1987;  Csernák,  1992;  Bukodi  2004,  Spéder,  2005).  Most  of  these 
changes may be strongly connected to the social-economic transformation that started 
in  1989–1990.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  apparent  that  several  processes,  albeit  with 
moderate  dynamics,  were  present  prior  to  political  changes  (see  Hoem  et  al.,  2007 
Spéder, 2006). Furthermore, the spread of divorce – which Lesthaeghe regarded as one 
of the key indicators of the new demographic transition (Lesthaeghe, 1996) – took off 
in the 1960s, and it has continued until now. Without a more profound analysis of 
causes  and  consequences,  we  may  assert  that  changes  in  partnership  are  strongly 
associated with fertility relations (see also below). 
 
 
4.1 Development of marriages  
Total first marriage rate (TFMR) is the classic indicator of partnership behaviour, which 
demonstrates  changes  in  the  popularity  of  marriage  over  time  (Figure  13).  TFMR 
showed some fluctuation between 1960 and 1980; however, this fluctuation remained 
within the range of 0.9 and 1, indicating that the vast majority of people would get 
married at some time. Following this period, the indicator started to decrease, and this 
trend  accelerated  following  the  political  transition.  While TFMR  decreased  by  0.15 
between 1980 and 1990, it dropped by more than 0.25 between 1990 and 2000. Since 
the early 2000s, the indicator has stagnated somewhat below 0.5. The constant increase 
in the mean age at first marriage indicates a tempo distortion, and consequently the 
proportion  of  people  ever  getting  married  will  probably  be  considerably  higher. 
However  other  processes,  listed  below,  will  probably  prevent  the  return  to  a  high 
TFMR level.  Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
 
 
The mean age at first marriage showed a high degree of stability before the change 
in the political system. Women married for the first time at the age of 21–22, while men 
married at age 24–25. This age started to increase at the beginning of regime change 
(1990) and has kept rising until today; it rose by five years among both women and men 
over 15 years (Figure 14). In the process of postponement, which is demonstrated by 
age-specific first marriage rates (Figure 15), the shift of the first marriage to a later age 
plays a significant role in fuelling both the decline in the commonly used period TFMR 
due to ‘tempo distortions’ and leading to an overall lower marriage intensity. It can be 
seen  that  first  marriages  were  generally  contracted  around  the  age  of  22  under 
socialism,  and  at  the  age  of  27–28  in  recent  years.  Our  figure  unambiguously 
demonstrates the drop in marriages.  
The metamorphosis of marriage, as we will describe it in detail in the subsequent 
chapters, is primarily due to the expansion of cohabitation, which may be depicted in 
detail by utilising survey data. 
 Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
http://www.demographic-research.org   621 





































Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
 
 





































Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
Note: Rates refer to all women in a given age, irrespective of their marital status (‘incidence rates’) . 
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4.2 The spread of cohabitation  
The expansion of cohabitation played the crucial role in the pluralisation of partnership 
relations.  Heuveline  and  Timberlake’s  (2004)  comparative  study  illustrated  that 
cohabitation  takes  diverse  forms.  From  these,  we  highlight  “cohabitation  as  first 
partnership,” and cohabitation after the dissolution of marriage or divorce as being most 
prevalent. In Hungary, historically, the latter partnership form appeared first, and the 




4.2.1 The spread of cohabitation  
Carlson  and  Klinger  (1987)  demonstrated  that  there  are  numerous  Hungarian 
peculiarities concerning non-marital cohabitation. The authors examined the spread of 
cohabitation, and compared Hungarian and international data at three points in time (in 
1970, 1980, and 1984). They concluded that widows and divorced women were twice 
as likely to live in cohabitation as unmarried women. In other words, this life style was 
usually associated with a later section of the life course in Hungary, in contrast with 
Western Europe. The mean source of the spread of cohabitation in Hungary was new 
partnerships after divorce: in 1970, about one-tenth of divorced (and widowed) women 
aged 15–49, and only one out of 50 unmarried women, lived in cohabitation (Csernák, 
1992: 36). The ratio of divorced and widowed women who live in cohabitation has 
continuously increased until today (in 2005, 29.6% of divorced women and 19.3% of 
widows  aged  15–49  lived  in  cohabitation).  However,  in  the  recent  past,  unmarried 
women—or,  more  precisely,  single  women  in  their  first  cohabitation—have  started 
playing the most important role in the spread of cohabitation.  
 
 
4.2.2 First partnership: marriage or cohabitation  
The  distribution  of  first  partnerships  between  marriage  and  cohabitation  clearly 
demonstrates the dynamics of the spread of the “new type” of cohabitation (Figure 16). 
It is obvious that cohabitation as the first partnership had already shifted from marginal 
to important before the change of political regime. At the beginning of the 1980s, one-
fifth  of  first  unions,  and,  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  one-third  of  first  unions,  were 
cohabitations. At the same time, it is also clear that the spread of cohabitations as first 
partnerships accelerated after the change of political regime. It has almost become a 
norm that young people begin their first partnership in cohabitation.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Source: Own calculations, “Turning points of the life-course” 1
st and 2
nd wave, Demographic Research Institute, 2001–2005. 
 
 
Significant  proportions  of  those  who  established  their  first  partnership  as 
cohabitation  later  transform  the  arrangement  into  marriage.  The  intensity  of  this 
process,  however,  declines  slightly  with  time.  While  54%  of  cohabitations  as  first 
partnership ended up in marriage within five years at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
comparative  figure  was  47%  at  the  end  of  the  1990s.  Although  cohabitations  that 
precede  marriage  continue  to  make  up  a  significant  proportion  of  unmarried 
relationships,  a  gradual  shift  towards  cohabitations  that  are  not  transformed  into 
marriage may be observed.  
If we examine the development of first partnerships by cohorts of women, we can 
also see that the ratio of those not partnered until a given age (e.g., age 25) increased 
among women born at the turn of the 1970s, and continued to rise among younger 
cohorts (Spéder 2006). Based on these findings, we may conclude that postponement is 
also characteristic for the timing of the first partnership.  
 
 
4.2.3 Some characteristics of the spread of cohabitations  
Different assumptions exist regarding which social groups played the crucial role in the 
spread of cohabitations (Bukodi 2004; Bumpass – Lu 2000; Cherlin 1992; Hoem 1986; 
Kiernan 2000, Villeneuve-Gokalp 1991). Based on these studies, two distinct concepts Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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were established regarding the spread and structural embeddedness of cohabitations. 
One of them asserts that cohabitation, in a way that is similar to the diffusion pattern of 
fashion trends, expands downwards from the top of the social hierarchy to groups at the 
lower end of the social scale (‘graduates as trendsetters’). An alternative assumption, 
which is primarily based on the results of research carried out in the US (Bumpass–Lu 
2000; Cherlin 1992), posits that cohabitation as first union is mostly preferred among 
blue-collar workers, rather than among groups with higher education (‘working class 
phenomenon’). 
The  results  of  testing  the  above-mentioned  alternative  assumption  in  Hungary 
revealed that the second hypothesis is more characteristic of the Hungarian situation
9. It 
is sufficiently demonstrated if we examine the share of cohabitations as first partnership 
within different cohorts by education level (see Figure 17). Starting from the oldest 
cohort,  the  rate  of  starting  the  partnership  life  course  with  cohabitation  is  highest 
(exceeding 50%), and becomes dominant, among those with the lowest schooling. The 
only exception is the youngest cohort, born between 1972 and 1976, among whom there 
are hardly any differences regarding education level.  
 
Figure 17:  The ratio of woman choosing cohabitation as first union until  
  age 25 in relation to those entering any kind of union by birth  











































Source: Own calculations, HGGS ‘Turning Points of the Life-Course’ 1
st and 2
nd wave, HCSO DRI, 2001–2005. 
                                                            
9 For a detailed analysis of the issue, see Spéder, 2005. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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At  the  same  time,  the  spread  of  cohabitation  has  recently  been  most  dynamic 
among those with higher education. While the ratio of cohabitations to all first unions 
among  highly  educated  women  was  only  8%  among  those  born  between  1957  and 
1961, this figure was 25%, 41.1%, and 61.1% among the subsequent five-year cohorts, 
respectively. Thus, the diffusion of cohabitation as a life style and as a pattern started in 
the lower social group, and then accelerated on both poles of the social hierarchy. Those 
in the middle adjusted themselves to the trend with delay. 
Bukodi’s detailed investigations of the choice between cohabitation and marriage 
as a first union identified two crucial factors (Bukodi, 2004: 157ff.). The socialization 
hypothesis  −  i.e.,  people  whose  parents  are  divorced  are  more  inclined  to  choose 
cohabitation  as  a  first  union−  confirm  our  findings.  Her  second  conclusion,  that 
cohabitation is preferred by people with insecure labor market status (occasional jobs, 
fixed term contracts) or by those who study and work at the same time, does not fully 
support our findings.  
 
 
4.3 Childbirth propensity in marriage and cohabitation  
Currently we have no comprehensive understanding of the connection between new 
partnership practices and fertility; i.e., of whether the fertility of those living in lasting 
cohabitation, of those starting with cohabitation and then getting married, and of people 
who marry directly, differs or converges. We can, however, reflect upon one aspect of 
this  issue:  the  degree  to  which  childbearing  among  those  choosing  marriage  or 
cohabitation as first union differs in the first five years, and whether or not this practice 
has changed. We analyse whether the first child was born during this period. 
Nine out of 10 of those marrying directly give birth to their first child within five 
years (Table 2). This ratio was stable for many years; however, it started to decrease in 
the 1990s: the corresponding figure is only 80% among partnerships that started as 
marriage at the beginning of the 1990s, and only 77.8% among partnerships that started 
as marriage at the end of 1990s. Apparently, the practice of childbearing has also been 
altered also in the traditional partnership form.  
Comparing the first birth rates of those starting with cohabitation to those who 
directly marry, we may conclude that those who started with cohabitation are about 
20% less likely to  have children than those choosing  marriage as  first  union in all 
partnership cohorts. The decrease in first birth rates is also significant among those 
starting in cohabitation: it fell from around 70% to 60%; and then, according to the 
data, the ratio of those having child within five years dipped to below 50%. Clearly, 
those  who  establish  their  first  partnerships  in  the  1990s,  regardless  of  the  form  of Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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partnership, are less likely to have children within a fixed period of five years than in 
the previous decades.  
It is obvious that the development of fertility is strongly related to the development 
of  partnerships.  We  know  that  the  establishment  of  partnerships  and  childbearing 
behaviour are mutually depend on each other, but some further distinctions could be 
made. It appears to be the case that particular partnership types carry different levels of 
fertility potential: people cohabiting as a first union are less likely to enter parenthood 
within a certain time period than those choosing marriage as a first union. Therefore, 
the fact that today more people start their partnerships with cohabitation has a large 
effect on fertility trends among the total population. However, declines in childbearing 
propensity  within  particular  partnership  types  contribute  independently  to  this 
development, as well.  
 
Table 2:  Share of births within five years from the establishment of the  
  first partnership, by period and type of first union  
 
Type of first union  Period of first partnership 
formation  Marriage  Cohabitation 
1970–1974  89.5  (78.9) 
1975–1979  91.5  (81.8) 
1980–1984  90.1  60.5 
1985–1989  89.5  68.8 
1990–1994  83.9  64.5 
1995–1999  77.3  47.5 
 
Source: Own calculations, HGGS ‘Turning Points of the Life-Course’ 1
st and 2
nd wave, HCSO DRI, 2001–2005. 
Note: (  ): Number of cases between 50 and 100. 
 
 
4.4 Extramarital births  
Childbirth out of wedlock had not played a significant role in Hungarian fertility for a 
long  period  of  time.  Hungary,  on  the  verge  of  Hajnal’s  line  (Hajnal,  1965),  was 
generally characterised by early childbirth and even earlier marriage. Until the 1980s, 
the share of extramarital births never exceeded 10%, and it was around 5% in the 1960s 
and the 1970s. In case of unexpected or “early” pregnancies, couples tended to marry 
rather than having a non-marital child. In the mid-1970s, 22%–25% of brides were 
already pregnant when uttering the great “I do.” The percentage of extramarital births 
exceeded 10% for the first time at the end of the 1980s, reached 20% in the mid-1990s, 
passed  the  30%  mark  at  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  and  has  continued  to  climb Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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thereafter (Figure 18). The increase was accelerated after the change of political regime. 
In 2006, non-marital fertility constituted 37% of the PTFR. 
There are, however, clear differences in the ratio of extramarital births by birth 
order: the ratio is, for example, highest among first and fourth and higher order births. 
Whereas before the political transformation the ratio of non-marital fourth and higher 
order births was at least two times higher than among any other birth order, in recent 
years, the difference between first and fourth and higher order births has diminished.  
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Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
 
 
Obviously,  the  rise  in  the  share  of  childbearing  among  cohabitating  couples 
explains the increase in extramarital births. According to the results of the Demographic 
Research Institute (DRI)’s representative survey on extramarital children in 1996 (see 
S.  Molnár,  Pongrácz,  1998),  three-fifths  of  extramarital  children  were  born  in 
cohabitation, while two-fifths of these births were to single mothers. More than half 
(59.6)  of  those  lone  mothers  said  that  they  were  in  “close  relationship  without 
cohabitation” with the father (S. Molnár, Pongrácz, 1998). This survey highlights how 
difficult it is to define exactly whether the birth took place in cohabitation or not, since 
the boundaries of cohabitation are “fluid.” Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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The HGGS survey makes it possible to depict the partnership context at the birth 
of the child and examine its temporal development
10. Three partnership contexts can be 
differentiated:  marriage,  cohabitation,  and  living  alone  without  partnership.  On  the 
basis of this survey, we can conclude that the increase in extramarital births is basically 
due to the fast diffusion of childbirth in cohabitation. While, according to our data, 2%–
3% of first births took place in cohabitation at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s, and 
the share single mothers was twice as high (see Figure 19); the corresponding ratio rose 
to 17.5% at the end of the  1990s, and reached 21.4% at the beginning of the  new 
millennium. At the same time, the ratio of lone parents increased, as well, rising from 
around  2%–3%  prior  to  the  change  of  regime,  to  around  10%  later.  As  mentioned 
previously, fewer higher order children are born in cohabitation: before the change of 
regime, 95% of second order children were born in marriage, and half of parents of the 
remaining 5% lived in cohabitation or alone. The situation changed at the millennium: 
the majority of the 15% extramarital second order children were born in cohabitation.  
 
 
Figure 19:  Distribution of first births by partnership status of the mother, 1965– 
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Source: Own calculations, HGGS ‘Turning Points of the Life-Course’ 1
st and 2
nd wave, HCSO DRI, 2001–2005. 
 
                                                            
10 GGS slightly underestimates the number of extramarital births.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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According to our analysis, non-marital childbearing is linked to specific social-
demographic features and situations: we shall emphasise the very young and late ages at 
childbirth, and being at parity 0. Also, people with lower levels of education, those 
belonging to the Romany minority, and the non-religious tend to prefer extramarital 
births  (Spéder,  2004).  It  should  be  noted  that,  while  people  with  higher  levels  of 
education play a crucial role in the spread of cohabitation, the frequency of childbearing 
in cohabitation is significantly lower among them than for the total population. Thus, 
the spread of extramarital births does not follow the diffusion of a “fashion,” as it does 
not expand top-down; rather, it diffuses by “leaking up from below.”  
 
 
4.5 Divorce, stability of partnerships  
At the time of the universality of marriage, the analysis of partnership dissolution was 
limited to divorce. As cohabitation widely proliferates, separations among cohabiting 
partners  also  have  to  be  examined.  The  aggregate  consequence  of  partnership 
dissolution for fertility is not clear-cut. Divorce and separation obviously mean a break 
in the previous fertility career and may therefore be accompanied by lower completed 
fertility.  However,  many  divorced  and  separated  individuals  seek  to  seal  their  new 
partnership  with  a  common  childbirth,  and  this  may  eventually  contribute  to  rising 
completed fertility among women (see Billari, 2005).  
 
 
4.5.1 Development of divorce  
The total divorce rate provides a comprehensive view of the chances that marriages will 
remain stable and not break up too early (see Figure 20). The phenomenon of divorce 
has been known in Hungarian society throughout the 20
th century, but divorce was only 
“peripheral” until the 1960s (Lıcsei, 1971; Csernák, 1996). According to Lıcsei, its 
spread  and  expansion  is  related  to  forced  industrialisation  and  the  comprehensive 
political  programme  restructuring  all  dimensions  of  social  life  (Lıcsei,  1971).  The 
increase beginning in the 1960s has been almost undiminished until today. The rise in 
the number of divorces only stopped temporarily at the end of the 1980s, when the 
family law was modified, making the divorce procedure more cumbersome and time-
consuming. Thereafter, the total divorce rate returned to the previous increasing trend 
line.  If  the  current  (2006)  propensity  to  divorce  continues,  45%  of  marriages  will 
eventually break up. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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Source: Vital statistics data, Demographic Yearbooks HCSO. 
 
 
4.5.2 Dynamics of the dissolution of first partnerships  
Using  survey  data  broken  down  by  cohorts,  we  may  examine  the  stability  of  first 
partnerships, including the stability of first cohabitations. It also makes the analysis of 
tendencies and comparisons possible if we examine the first union within five years (60 
months) after its onset, and determine whether or not it terminated during this period. 
This indicator could be calculated in each partnership cohort for partnerships starting 
both as marriages and as cohabitations (see Table 3). According to HGGS data, the 
likelihood  of  partnership  dissolution  unambiguously  increased  during  the  last  two 
decades of the twentieth century. While less than one-tenth of first unions formed in the 
1970s broke up within five years, the corresponding ratio exceeded 10% for unions 
formed in the 1980s, and it reached 21.5% for those started at the end of the 1990s.  
If we compare the fragility of partnerships by type of first partnership, we can see 
that cohabitations are much more likely to break up than marriages as first unions. 
Moreover,  we  can  also  perceive  that,  with  cohabitation  as  first  union  becoming 
dominant, this fragility does not decrease, but rises. While a little more than one-fifth of 
first cohabitations established in the 1970s–1980s terminated within five years, 30.3% 
of first cohabitations that started between 1995 and 1999 broke up within 60 months. 
However, the rate of break-up of marriage as a first union within five years did not 
change during the same period. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Numerous  analyses  detect  strong  relationships  between  partnership  status  and 
childbirth propensity. Without analysing the relationship of causes and consequences, it 
may  be  assumed  that  the  increasing  instability  of  partnerships  played  a  role  in  the 
decrease in fertility after the change of political regime. 
 
Table 3:  Partnership status 60 months after the establishment of  
  first partnership  
 
Date of establishment of first partnership 
Partnership state  1965–1969  1970–1974  1975–1979  1980–1984  1985–1989  1990–1994  1995–1999 
60 months after the first partnership             
Continuous partnership   92.3  91.3  90.9  87.5  87.0  82.8  78.5 
Dissolved partnership   7.7  8.7  9.1  12.5  13.0  17.2  21.5 
60 months after marriage as first union           
Lives in marriage   93.7  92.7  92.7  90.2  91.4  88.2  91.8 
Divorced  6.3  7.3  7.3  9.8  8.6  11.8  8.2 
60 months after cohabitation as first union           
Lives in the same 
partnership   –  (75.0)
*  78.9  77.0  78.3  75.9  69.7 
Dissolved cohabitation  –  (25.0)  21.1  23.0  21.7  24.1  30.3 
 
Source: Own calculations, HGGS ‘Turning Points of the Life-Course’ 1
st and 2




5. Social, structural and institutional environment for childbearing  
We may take institutional, social, and economic structural frameworks into account as 
given  circumstances  for  different  types  of  social  action,  including  childbearing 
decisions. Usually, social and environmental conditions tend to change step-by-step, 
making the gradual adaptation by  members of that  society possible. It is especially 
important to record these circumstances when they change from one day to the next, in 
an  almost  revolutionary  manner.  This  period,  the  transition  from  socialism  to 
capitalism, was termed change of regime by social scientists not by chance, and it is 
accompanied  by  the  radical  transformation  of  politics,  social  integration,  and  the 
functioning of economy (see Adamski, et al., 2002, Spéder, et al., 2002). However, both 
the  periods  before  and  after  1990  were  characterised  by  rapid  change.  Under 
communism,  prior  to  1990,  central  power  was  able  to  transform  the  system  of 
institutions almost from one day to the next, and it did so to a large extent in Hungary 
after 1956 and 1968. Moreover, since 1990, globalisation and European integration has 
been continuously reshaping the social environment of everyday life. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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It is not unusual to assign an outstanding role to socio-economic conditions in the 
development of fertility. For example, Macura and his colleagues elaborated the “crisis 
hypothesis”  as  an  explanation  for  fertility  decline  (Macura  et  al.,  2000),  and  they 
attributed central importance to lower economic performance, growing inequalities, the 
spread of unemployment, and the resulting general loss of security. 
In order to understand fertility decision making within a structural context, we 
must  examine  systematically  the  factors  that  structure  the  entry  into  adulthood  and 
family formation. Among these factors are the following: a) the system of education; b) 
the working of the labour market; c) access to housing, i.e., the housing market, state 
home construction, and financing; d) the development of income level and changes in 
income inequalities; and e) child-related welfare programs. As relatively little relevant 
research has been conducted on the relationships between the previously mentioned 
aspects and childbearing, we have to limit the discussion of the above factors to three 
areas. In the following, we will discuss the possible effects of the system of education 
and labour market. The relevant welfare programs will be described and evaluated at 
Section 7.  
 
 
5.1 Education  
It is  well  known that childbearing and being a  full-time student involve practically 
irreconcilable role expectations (Blossfeld, Huinik, 1991); thus, childbearing decisions 
are usually made after studies have been completed. Otherwise, one practically has to 
reckon  with  the  interruption  of  the  student  career
11.  The  limited  capacities  of  the 
educational system frequently affect the life course of young adults, as capacity limits 
may imply an interruption in their progression to acquiring education and entering the 
labour market. Since higher education plays the key role in infertility postponement, we 
summarise the main changes to this system here. 
During the socialist era, before 1990, state-specified higher education capacities 
determined  the  percentage  of  secondary  school  graduates  who  went  on  to  higher 
education, and the number of potential university or college students within one cohort. 
This rate was about 10% of all cohorts during socialism. At the beginning of the period 
under investigation, men preferred to study longer and at a higher level than women. 
But, with the spread of female employment, the education participation of both genders 
gradually became balanced, until finally female participation exceeded that of men in 
the 1980s. The drop in male participation was basically due to the deterioration of the 
relative income position of graduates in the 1980s (Andorka, 1997). 
                                                            
11 We do not deal with the problem of lifelong learning here. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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After  the  change  of  political  regime,  due  to  capacity  extension  and  increased 
demand for higher education, participation in higher education rose to unprecedented 
levels within a short time period. According to HCSO data, close to one-half of 20-
year-olds are full-time students (see Figure 21). 
 









































Source: Educational statistics, HCSO. 
 
 
It  is  also  noteworthy  that  full-time  education  involves  the  20–24-year-old 
generation, who used to be the most active in childbearing during communism. Evening 
and distance learning courses, still in expansion, mostly concerns people above age 25 
(34.5% of all evening and distance learning students were 25–29 years old and 20.9% 
were 30–34 years old in 2005). There is no scientific evidence about the extent of 
conflict between childbearing and participation in evening or distance learning courses.  
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Before analysing the possible effects of the labor market on fertility, we briefly outline 
an interpretation framework that, in our opinion, may help us to understand better the 




5.2.1 Interpretation framework: the effects of political transition from the 
perspective of market dis-equilibrium theory  
The  labour  market  works  as  an  allocation  mechanism  in  both  capitalism  and  state 
socialism; however, its state differs under these two systems, according to the market 
theory  of  disequilibrium  (Kornai,  1972;  1980).  Its  functioning  was  qualitatively 
different in the redistributive socialist mixed economy, which is based on state property, 
and in the market economy, which is based on private property. The theory assumes 
that  all  types  of  markets  lack  equilibrium  in  demand  and  supply.  According  to  the 
analyses of Kornai, the labour market of the market economy is characterised by “over-
supply”  and  “under-demand”  for  labour,  whereas  the  labour  market  of  the  socialist 
economy suffers from “over-demand” and “under-supply.” The power of employers is 
stronger in the private property-based labour market of “over-supply,” which allows 
them to choose among potential employees. By contrast, the employee is in a more 
advantageous  position  in  the  state  property-based  labour  market  of  “over-demand” 
(“employers seek the favour of employees”). For this reason, employers dictate in the 
former  case,  setting  the  conditions  of  employment  and  choosing  among  potential 
employees  according  to  their  wishes  and  needs.  In  the  latter  case,  it  is  easy  for 
employees to obtain or squeeze out concessions (Kornai, 1980: Chapter 7). 
The  political  regime  change  in  the  1990s  therefore  led  to  a  qualitative  and  a 
quantitative change in the labour market at the same time. It was already an almost 
impossible  task  for  employees  to  defend  and  keep  their  positions  under  the 
circumstances of narrowing job supply (quantitative character). At the same time, the 
power  relations  that  controlled  working  conditions  were  also  reorganised,  with  the 
direct  consequence  that  many  employees  became  exposed  at  their  workplaces 
(qualitative  character).  They  were  less  able  to  partake  in  the  determination  of  their 
working hours, the utilisation of their working time became much more intensive, and 
                                                            
12 The role of the labour market −both from a theoretical perspective and based on empirical evidence− was 
analysed elsewhere in detail (see Spéder 2002). Argumentation in this section is based on the mentioned 
study. In this short overview we do not refer extensively to the relevant literature. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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their  employers  became  less  willing  to  take  their  individual  (family)  interests  into 
consideration (see Zsille, 1993 [1980]: 225ff). 
The transformation of the labour market that we have outlined above may also 
have  far-reaching  consequences  on  childbearing  behaviour,  especially  on  the 
reconciliation of work and family. With their formerly advantaged situation turned into 
defencelessness, the ability of employees to advocate for their interests beyond raising 
income, including balancing their family and parental roles with their responsibilities as 
employees,  was  reduced.  That  is  to  say,  it  was  presumably  much  more  difficult  to 
reconcile family and work given the labour market conditions of the 1990s than in the 
state property-based redistributive shortage economy of the 1980s. More precisely: in 
reconciling the claims of family and work, the considerations of the former were much 
less likely to prevail. Therefore, employees who were able to enforce their individual 
interests within certain limits in shortage economy found themselves defenceless, and 
their  bargaining  position  much  weaker,  in  a  market  economy
13.  One  of  the 
manifestations of this change is that, while company crèches and kindergartens were 
built  during  the  period  of  state-socialism  in  order  to  create  advantageous  working 
conditions for female employees, companies strove to dispose of these responsibilities 
and institutions after the change of political regime. 
 
 
5.2.2 Development of female employment  
Extensive industrialisation began with the establishment of the state socialist regime (at 
the end of the 1940s), resulting in huge labour force demand and rapidly increasing 
female participation in the labour market. In 1949, 34.6% of 15-54-year-old women 
were employed; 10 years later, in 1960, 49.9% of this group were full-time employees. 
In 1970, 63.7% of women aged 15-54 had gainful employment. By the 1980s, female 
employment became practically universal (about 80%), approaching the employment 
rate of men (Fóti, Lakatos 1998). 
The  transformation  of  the  economic  system  following  the  change  of  political 
regime was conveyed to the people via the labour market. The tightening of the labour 
market  started  in  1992  and  lasted  until  1996-1997,  with  the  number  of  employees 
decreasing by approximately one million during this period. Later, employment levels 
began to rise, and have changed only minimally since 2000. The unemployment rate 
among  women  fluctuated at  around 10% between 1992 and 1996 (with the  highest 
value of 12.1% in 1993), and then decreased. It was 6.4% in 2000 and 7.2% in 2005 
(KSH, 2007c:23p.). 
                                                            
13 Their position is even weaker than that of their Western colleagues, since the trade union movement is 
generally more widespread there. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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Although many expected the opposite, data show that women did not belong to the 
losers  in  the  transition  from  state  socialism  to  capitalism  (Frey  2001,  Spéder  at  al. 
2002). The displacement of women from the labour market was not greater than that of 
men. In particular, female employment was high in the service sector, which did not 
suffer  losses  nearly  as  serious  as  those  that  occurred  in  industry  or  agriculture. 
Moreover,  it  was  advantageous  that  the  level  of  education  among  women  was 
comparable to men’s schooling. Finally, the earning power of women relative to men, 
also increased after the change of political regime (Galasi 2001). 
 
 
5.2.3 Childbearing in a changing (labour) market environment  
First, we examine the relationship between labour market and childbearing through the 
distribution of new parents’ activity status, and then we introduce standardised data for 
the period between 1993 and 2000. 
The distribution of the economic status of new mothers in 1990 provides a good 
illustration of the period of state-socialism. During the period of almost full female 
employment, four-fifths of women who gave birth to a child were employed, 7.5% were 
on  parental  leave,  and  one-tenth  were  homemakers  or  dependents  (see  Figure  22). 
These figures illustrate that childbearing and childrearing were reconcilable with work. 
Since  1990,  two  periods  can  be  distinguished  regarding  the  new  mothers’  activity 
status. In the first phase, lasting to 1997–98, the ratio of employees among mothers 
decreased, and, parallel to this development, the proportion of unemployed women and 
homemakers increased (Figure 22). The percentage of mothers on parental leave hardly 
changed during the same period, remaining at around 10%. The share of new mothers 
who  were  employed  or  on  childcare  leave  clearly  increased  during  the  subsequent 
period, and the proportion of unemployed mothers decreased. From 2001, the ratio of 
homemakers also declined. 
We  can  ascertain  more  precisely  the  extent  of  the  differences  in  childbearing 
propensity by activity status if we project the activity status of mothers immediately 
prior to childbearing to all women of fertile age in the same status. For this purpose, the 
data  of  vital  statistics  and  the  Labour  Force  Survey  had to  be  projected onto  each 
other
14.  This  allows  us  to  calculate  birth  rates  per  1,000  women  by  three  activity 
statuses: employed, on parental leave, other dependent, and inactive (e.g., homemaker). 
 
                                                            
14 We had to make various assumptions for our calculations. First, we had to harmonise the category systems 
of vital statistics and labour force survey data; second, we standardised them with data from the labour force 
survey from the year before; third, we calculated standardised data only for a registered population. Detailed 
description of the calculations can be found at Spéder et al.  2002.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Source:  Own calculations, Vital statistics HCSO.  
 
 
Our first finding concerns the level of childbearing. Childbearing propensity is 
unambiguously higher among the employed than among those who do not have a job 
(Figure  23).  The  low  childbearing  propensity  of  people  on  parental  leave  can  be 
attributed  to  their  parenthood  status  –  they  can  only  have  second-  or  higher-order 
children. Micro-level studies prove that, controlling for other factors (like parity, age, 
and partnership), the childbearing propensity of people on parental leave is above the 
average (Spéder, Kapitány, 2007b). 
Regarding  fertility  trends  by  activity,  people  with  different  statuses  followed 
diverse  routes  during  the  analysed  period.  Childbearing  propensity  of  the  employed 
decreased slowly but steadily until 1999. Live births per 1,000 employed women were 
76.4 in 1993 and 69.3 in 1999. Subsequently, no further decline can be experienced. 
Thus, the share of employed women within all live births did decline during the period 
under survey, not only because of the narrowing labour market, but also because of the 
decrease in the childbearing propensity of employees. 
Childbearing  propensity  of  women  on  parental  leave  —ratio  of  live  births  per 
thousand women on parental leave– was practically undiminished until 1995. The value 
of 35–38 children per thousand women for the period between 1995 and 1997 differed 
from those reached in both the preceding and the subsequent periods (Figure 23). A 
robust increase took place in 1999. These trend shifts can be accurately linked to family Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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policy measures. The ‘Bokros Package’
15 clearly held back childbearing propensity, 
which, after the change of government in 1998, “returned” to the level before 1995 
among  women  on  parental  leave.  This  result  is  in  agreement  with  our  micro-level 
analyses (see Aassve et al. 2006). That is to say, those who remain on parental leave 
and receive childcare allowance are very susceptible to the changes of family policy. 
The  group  of  people  with  children  in  other  status  is  quite  heterogeneous  – 
unemployed or dependent people, inactive earners and homemakers are among them –
so we should be careful with our conclusions. If we take into consideration that the 
number  of  students  increased  strongly  at  the  end  of  the  1990s,  we  can  assume  an 
increasing  childbearing  propensity  of  non-employed  and  not-in-study  (homemaker, 
unemployed, dependent) adults.  
 
Figure 23  Live births per 1000 women aged 15–39 by economic status, 1993– 























































Source: own calculation based on vital statistics and Labour Force Survey, HCSO. 
 
                                                            
15 The ’Bokros Package’, introduced in 1995, and named about the minister of finance Lajos Bokros, greatly 
reduced the state budget and profoundly reshaped the child related welfare programs; see detailed description 
in Section 7. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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5.2.4 Women’s opinion on the reconcilability of family and work  
The problem of reconciling family roles and work expectations is not recent. It 
emerged with the fast expansion of female employment, and, as we will see it in the 
discussion of family policy, it encouraged social policy-makers to establish institutions 
to help women balance work and family. The first available empirical data about the 
existence of this conflict is from the beginning of the 1970s. According to an opinion 
poll of 1973, the majority of women (63.2%) agreed with the statement that “if an 
employed  woman  has  children  under  10,  she  should  stay  at  home  by  all  means.” 
However,  a  not  negligible  minority  of  women  (36.8%)  said  that  “whenever  it  is 
possible, an employed woman should continue with her paid job, even if she has small 
children” (Pongrácz, S. Molnár, 1976). Staying at home was justified by traditional 
gender roles perceptions, while the continuation of gainful employment was justified by 
the necessity of the contribution of women’s earnings to the household budget. 
The constant problem of reconciling family and work, and the conflicts of female 
roles  during  state-socialism,  are  highlighted  by  data  that  ask  women  (with  small 
children) what they would do “if the husband were able to support the family.” On the 
one hand, a minority of women would stay at home exclusively; on the other hand, the 
majority of women who prefer employment would like a part-time job (see Table 4). 
The preference of part-time  employment unambiguously reflects the problem of the 
compatibility of family and work. According to a large-scale labour data collection in 
1999, almost a half of all 15-49-year-old women (48.8%) expressed their intention to 
work  part-time:  three-fifths  of  women  in  this  age  group,  and  28.3%  of  all  female 
respondents, agreed with the statement that a woman “would be able to take care of her 
family better” by working part-time (Frey, 2001: p.12).  
If  we  contrast  the  ideal  situation  sketched  above  with  the  fact  that  only  one-
twentieth (4.7%) of employed women had a part-time job in 2007 in Hungary, then we 
can  see  a  manifestation  of  the  tensions  between  ideals,  desires,  and  the  reality. 
Therefore, the need for an increase in part-time employment, as shown by our data 
(Table 4), could be interpreted as an outgrowth of family-work tensions.  
Family  policy  measures  that  remained  in  effect  after  the  change  of  political 
regime
16 theoretically should have eased the reconciliation of family and work. Surveys 
among  women  on  maternity  and  parental  leave  enable  us  to  see  the  family-work 
conflict from a life course perspective. Although women have the right to return to 
work after parental leave, they discern discrepancies between formal rights and their 
realisation in practice. Employment expectations of mothers with small children (under 
three years of age) on childcare leave are surprising given their guaranteed rights (KSH, 
2007b). Although a little more than half (55.3%) of the women surveyed expected the 
                                                            
16 Except for the period between 1995 and 1998, when the childcare fee was suspended. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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return to be trouble-free, the remainder of them, slightly less than the half, anticipated 
facing problems after childcare leave is over (Table 5). In 2005, one-tenth (10.4%) of the 
affected  women  said  they  could  not  return  to  their  former  workplaces  because  their 
employers had ceased operations. At best, the situation of those who told researchers that 
their “employer exists but does not want to employ” them – and one-quarter (26.2%) of the 
affected women belong to this group – is very precarious. While most of them have the 
right to return to work, employers may resort to numerous practices that make the actual 
return  improbable.
17  Therefore,  there  is  an  apparent  discrepancy  between  formally 
guaranteed rights and their practice that women clearly perceive. 
 
Table 4:  Replies of mothers to the following question: ‘If the husband earns  
enough to support the family, what would you choose?’ (1978, 1991, 
and 1998) 
 
  1978  1991  1998˝* 
Stay at home  37,0  33,0  25,8 
Work part-time  35,2  51,1  50,7 
Work full-time  24,0  13,6  23,5 
Do not know  3,8  2,3  XX 
Total  100  100  100 
 
Source: Pongrácz (2001), p. 36. 
Note: * Slightly different sample. 
 
Table 5:  The distribution of previously employed women on maternity leave  
  by the possibility of returning to work after their leave is over,  
  1993–2005 (%)  
 
  1993  1995  1999  2002  2005 
The employer has dissolved  8.6  9.2  10.0  12.3  10.4 
The employer exists but does not want to 
employ her  34.3  29.8  32.4  32.5  26.2 
The employer would employ her but she 
does not want to return there  6.7  8.7  11.2  9.9  8.1 
The employer would employ her and she 
wants to return   50.4  52.3  46.4  45.3  55.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Source: KSH, 2007. p. 8. 
                                                            
17 Law is enforceable only for a period of three months. If the position in question is terminated and the 
employer is not able to re-engage the employee in the same job, she may be offered a job that is not suitable 
for her. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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A short overview of the needs related to female employment and the opinions on 
the  perceived  conflict  between  family  and  employment  demonstrate  the  forces 
impeding the spread of female employment, and the qualitative changes of the labour 
market on fertility (childbearing) from the perspective of those concerned. After the 
expansion of women’s employment, the reconciliation of family and work has become 
indispensable, and it poses a constant challenge for mothers involved. The necessity of 
female employment have not decreased even after the regime change, however, the 
conflict between family and employment has intensified – according  to the  findings 
discussed in Section 5.2 – and people involved also perceive it. Therefore it is not 
unexpected that childbearing propensity has declined, especially among the employed. 
 
 
6. Values and attitudes  
The widely accepted “Second Demographic Transition” (SDT) framework emphasises 
the strong influences of ideational factors during the recent period of rapidly changing 
fertility patterns. It is very difficult to test this theory, since we are missing appropriate 
time series data of ideational indicators. However, at least some of our data go back to 
the  end  of  the  1970s.  Furthermore,  the  HGGS  enables  us  to  form  a  quite  accurate 
picture of the role of value orientation and attitudes in childbearing decisions. Our short 
review deals with this question from two perspectives: first, we indicate what values 
influence  childbearing  in  Hungary  today  by  summarising  our  empirical  analyses; 
second, we point out some tendencies of value change. And as a summary, we outline a 
possible framework of interpretation.  
 
 
6.1 Ideational factors affecting childbearing in present-day Hungary (effects in 
micro-models)  
The analysis of the two waves of HGGS panel data unambiguously refers to the fact 
that  values  play  a  determining  role  in  decision-making  about  childbearing  (Spéder, 
Kapitány, 2007). Since our explanatory variables exploited information gained in the 
first wave (2001/2002), and the dependent variable measured the events between the 
two waves (conception of child between 2002 and 2005), our results unambiguously 
measure  the  selection  effects  of  ideational  factors  (norms,  values,  attitudes).  The 
influence of ideational factors was greater at the birth of the second and third children 
than  at  the  birth  of  the  first  child  (entering  parenthood).  Furthermore,  there  are 
important differences between the attitudes influencing female and male behaviour.  Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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Norms  and  ideas  of  the  respondents  are  equally  decisive  for  the  first  and 
subsequent childbirths. While the age norm of becoming a parent plays a crucial role in 
the birth (and timing) of the first child, the norm of the ideal number of children is of 
more importance in the case of further childbearing (cf. Billari, Liefbroer 2007).  
The  impact  of  the  extent  of  individualisation  and  striving  for  autonomy  was 
measured  by  partnership  ideals.  Those  who  consider  individual  autonomy  to  be 
important in their partnerships and do not intend to adjust their partnership to traditional 
community norms are less likely to give birth to children.  
Among men, the variable of future perspectives proved to be of major importance. 
Men with an optimistic view of the future were unambiguously more likely to have 
child. (This result was significant when controlling for financial situation and labour 
market  status.)  Among  women,  the  “future  perspective”  variable  played  no  role; 
however, religiousness had an effect in accordance with expectations: religious women, 
controlling for all other factors, were more likely to have second and further children. 
The  above  results  may  indicate  that  “inner”  attitudes  and  norms  that  are 
closely related to childbearing are more decisive in the case of women, whereas, in the 
case of men, the effect of “outer” attitudes, general perspectives that are not related to 
fertility, is stronger.  
 
6.2 Selected features of value changes in Hungary (macro-level associations)  
According  to  the  concept  of  the  SDT,  certain  value  changes  –  the  dissolution  of 
community  norms,  individualisation,  the  notion  of  gender  equality,  hedonism,  and 
secularisation – played crucial roles in the spread of new partnership forms and fertility 
behaviours  (Lesthaeghe,  1996).  Hereafter,  we  summarise  tendencies  that  may  be 
relevant from the perspective of the transformation of demographic behaviour.  
 
 
6.2.1 What do value surveys reveal?  
Between 1978 and 2003, numerous general value surveys were carried out with the help 
of  the  Rokeach  Test  (see  Füstös  2004)
18.  Significant  change  was  measured  among 
terminal values: in 1978, “family security” was the second most important, with the 
value of 5.2; two and a half decades later, in 2003, it was the most important, with the 
                                                            
18 When filling out a Rokeach Test, interviewees are first asked to rank 16 “terminal” values, then 16 
“instrumental” values. “Terminal values” are end states we hope to achieve in life (e.g., “comfortable life,” 
“exciting life,” “freedom,” “family security,” “self-respect,” etc.). “Instrumental values” are means of 
achieving those end states (e.g., “ambitious,” “capable,” “helpful,” “imaginative,” independent,” etc.). The 
lower the scoring of a specific item, the more important is it in the hierarchy of preferences.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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value of 4.2. The importance of “material well-being” has also significantly increased. 
At the turn of the 1980s, it was the fifth most important terminal value, with the value 
of 8.2; however, in 2003, it was the fourth, with the value of 7.6. (In the mid-1990s, 
during the intensive period of transformation, it was among the three most important 
terminal values). The value of “true love” has also gained more importance. Values that 
do  not  rank  highly  on  the  preference  list  include  “social  recognition,”  “the  joy  of 
work,”,  “equality,”  and  “the  security  of  homeland.”  The  weakening  of  the  official 
values of socialism on the one hand, and the growing importance of financial well-
being  and  personal  values  (family  and  love)  on  the  other,  are  behind  the  slow 
transformation  of  values  (Füstös,  Szakolczay  1998)  All  these  findings  may  also  be 
interpreted as signs of growing individualisation, in line with the shift to a competitive 
economy; however, the growing importance of “family security” is a clear sign of the 
prevalence of traditional orientations.  
 
 
6.2.2 Atomisation and “individualisation” during the socialist era  
It is less known that distinct individualisation already took place during the socialist 
era. The first comprehensive comparative Hungarian value surveys produced a rather 
surprising result at the turn of the 1980s. When comparing the Hungarian and American 
value  structures,  Hankiss  and  his  colleagues  (1982)  came  the  conclusion  that  value 
orientations  were  highly  similar,  and  both  societies  were  characterised  by  strong 
individualisation. However, Hungarian individualisation differed considerably from its 
American  counterpart:  Hungary  lacked  the  embeddedness  of  the  individual  into 
communities and horizontal organisations. Therefore, the Hungarian processes (or the 
processes characteristic of communism) were denominated as “empty individualisation” 
(Hankiss et al, 1982). Looking back, it is not surprising that, despite the declaration of 
community ideology, a strongly atomised society was formed by the 1980s in socialist 
countries. The termination and dissolution of all the previously existing (religious, civil, 
youth, sport, etc.) organisations since the imposition on the totalitarian system, and, at 
the  same  time,  the  obstruction  of  all  horizontal  integration  that  differed  from 
hierarchical  organisation,  were  among  the  fundamental  interests  of  the  totalitarian 
system,  since  they  would  have  meant  conceptual  and  existential  challenges  to  the 
system.  Thus,  totalitarian  systems  broke  society  down  to  individuals  in  order  to 
organise it into a hierarchy
19. In other words, the individualisation and atomisation of 
society also characterised ex-socialist countries before 1990. 
                                                            
19 For a more detailed discussion of social mechanisms that created and maintained individualism during state 
socialism, see Spéder, 2005. p.95ff.  Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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After  the  change  of  political  regime,  mechanisms  that  were  well  known  from 
Western European development further encouraged individualisation and atomisation. 
The basic element of emerging market integration and democracy is competition, which 
facilitates  and  requires  individual  efforts,  and  provides  grounding  for  continuous, 
subsequent individualisation (see Friedrich 1998). Owing to their historical situation, 
the former state-socialist societies, including Hungary, had to face the most open form 
of competition: globalisation. We suppose that, due to the weakness of the civil society, 
trade unions, and to the destruction of horizontal organization, this competition is more 
cutthroat in the Eastern, “semi-peripheric” part of Europe than in Western Europe, in 
which is at the centre of globalisation. 
 
 
6.2.3 Change in the role of family  
In the totalitarian system, family was an “asylum” and meant “security” for members of 
society (Andorka 1997, Csernák 1992, Možný 1997, Somlai 1997). Moreover, during 
the  period  of  general  restrictions  that  covered  all  spheres,  the  establishment  and 
operation of a traditional family was the only means of individual freedom and self-
realisation  for  an  ordinary  person.  Accordingly,  the  socialist  regime  unintentionally 
strengthened the value of family and the traditional form of family life. At the same 
time, numerous mechanisms weakened family ties; forced modernisation, for example, 
led to an increase in the number of divorces. 
 
 
6.2.4 Financial wealth or childbearing  
Although  open  societal  discussions  that  took  place  under  communism  were  not 
independent of the central political directives, it would be hard to declare that they did 
not touch upon social problems. The “baby or car” debate of the early 1960s, which 
raised the issue of whether it is right to wait and have the first child only after acquiring 
a  car,  highlighted  the  conflict  between  consumer  aspirations  and  childbearing.  The 
debate  assumed  that  the  two  objectives  might  not  be  realised  at  the  same  time; 
therefore, one would have to choose between them. In the debate, the standpoint that 
castigated consumerist, “capitalist” behaviour was the dominant one; however, some 
participants in the discussion supported the notion of individual wealth and prosperity. 
We cannot introduce this debate in detail, but it is important to note that consumer 
aspirations were regarded as obstacles to childbearing, and the concept of “baby or car” 
still may be found in open discussions. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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While we cannot support this assertion with empirical data, we assume that the 
change of regime strengthened the above conflict
20. With the opening of markets, it 
became easy to obtain consumer goods (cars, hi-fi sets, household appliances, etc.) that 
were previously very scarce and of low quality. Let us remember that the value of 
“material well-being” rose in the preference system during that period. The dilemma 
was heightened by various factors: first, the budget limits of individuals and households 
made the rapid realisation of consumer aspirations impossible; second, the expanding 
range  of  supply  led  to  the  increase  in  aspirations;  and  third,  the  resources  of  most 
households decreased due to the transformation of the economy (increasing income 
inequalities, unemployment) during the same period of time. Inflation, the decreasing 
real value of family benefits, and the fact that they became income-tested made the 
competition between individual consumption and childbearing-related expenses explicit 
in the case of many families.  
 
 
6.2.5 Shifts in religiousness  
Religious  affiliation  and  religiousness  play  a  crucial  role  among  the  values  that 
influence fertility. Without providing a detailed analysis of the issue, we can assert that, 
in general, those practicing religion in accordance with the regulations of the church are 
more likely to have children. The forced secularisation of society was a continuous aim 
of  the  establishment  and  the  consolidation  of  state  socialism.  State  institutions 
consciously nationalised church institutions that had served secular purposes, and made 
the operation of churches impossible or highly restricted. Those practising their religion 
overtly  could  expect  that  their  everyday  lives  would  be  heavily  constrained.  They 
would not get appropriate employment or promotion, and they would be subject to the 
imposition  of  penalties.  Therefore,  it  was  not  a  coincidence  that  society  became 
secularised.  The  change  of  political  regime  meant  a  turning  point  in  religious  life: 
numerous institutions (schools, social care, hospitals) were returned to the churches, 
and  the  state  supported  their  operation. The  question  remains,  however,  of  to  what 
extent this revival was accompanied by the “revitalisation” of religiousness. Data imply 
that the ratio of the religious has not increased significantly, but secularisation was not 
continued. Furthermore, the group of religious changed somewhat: religion also gained 
importance among more advantaged groups of the social hierarchy.  
 
                                                            
20 For a more detailed discussion of this question, see Spéder, 2003. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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6.3 Maturation of values or the spread of new values?  
We do not have sufficient research results to take a strong position on the extent of the 
effects  of  values  and/or  structural  circumstances  (economic  development,  operating 
mechanism  of  the  economy,  institutional  conditions)  on  Hungarian  fertility 
development, and to estimate which may have played a more important part. However, 
the  existing  research  points  out  that  the  role  of  value  changes  must  not  have  been 
negligible. Moreover, we believe that different factors affected each other, helping or 
obstructing one another, and their roles were also modified during the transformation. 
Lesthagehe (1996) emphasised that economic and ideational factors shape demographic 
behaviour in “tandem.” While we agree that this is the case, it is also clear that, during 
certain  short  periods,  either  of  the  factors  may  accelerate  or  interrupt  the  ongoing 
development.  
We  assume  that  values  that  facilitated  or  required  the  establishment  of  a  new 
fertility practice were already “at hand” and “waited at the entrance” prior to the change 
of political regime: high divorce rates, the spread of cohabitation, a high degree of 
secularisation,  a  “rawer”  form  of  individualisation,  and  the  presence  of  atomisation 
allude  to  this,  as  do  the  overt  (and  increasing)  tension  between  employment  and 
childrearing, consumption, and childbearing. The inertia of everyday practice and the 
family  support  system  introduced  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  slowed  down  this 
transformation and strengthened the pattern of early childbearing. The change of the 
political  regime  brought  a  sudden  and  profound  change  in  structural  conditions 
affecting  everyday  life.  On  the  “ruins”  of  the  broken-down  system  of  previous 
institutions,  certain  demographic  behaviours  started  to  spread  quickly  (e.g., 
cohabitation).  New  possibilities  offered  by  educational  expansion  and  increased 
pressures of the labour market have been accompanied by the increasing participation in 
education  and  the  postponement  of  childbearing.  The  wide  range  of  supply  on  the 
market  of  goods  and  services  (cars,  furniture,  travel)  triggered  the  increasing 
competition between alternative life goals. It is not surprising that the realisation of 
consumer  aspirations  that  had  been  “pent  up”  for  decades  overshadowed  numerous 
other  aims  of  life.  At  the  same  time,  the  system  of  religious  institutions  has  been 
fortified and religiousness has spread to the top of social hierarchy.  
A joint analysis of ideational changes and institutional/structural circumstances is 
necessary for the understanding of individual demographic practices (decisions) and the 
macro-level  interpretation  of  fertility.  This  “tandem”  does  not,  however,  operate 
mechanically. In order to acquire a subtler image of their relationship and effects, we 
shall carry out numerous sub-analyses.  
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7. Population and family policies  
During past decades, several governmental measures were introduced to influence the 
demographic situation of Hungary. The majority of these measures aimed at reversing 
the  declining  number  of  births  by  influencing  fertility  behaviours.  Other  aspects  of 
demographic  problems  were  less  emphasised,  such  as  the  health  conditions  of  the 
population and the deteriorating situation in mortality, the question of family stability, 
or the permanent decrease in population numbers. Numerous measures were carried out 
that were not explicitly aimed at population policy, though they bore some relevance to 
these  goals  (e.g.,  the  establishment  and  extension  of  the  kindergartens).  A 
comprehensive and detailed overview of all the measures relevant to population and 
fertility  would  go  beyond  the  framework  of  the  present  study;  therefore,  we  have 
chosen to focus especially on cash supports and fundamental institutional changes, and 
those  measures  where  the  governmental  objective  was  declared  to  be  relevant  to 
population
21. In the first part of this section, we give an overview, organised according 
to type of measures and periods when most important population policy measures took 
place. Then we evaluate their effects.  
 
 
7.1 Population policy measures  
Introduced  before  the  Second  World  War,  the  family  allowance  is  the  oldest,  most 
permanent,  and  most  recognised  form  of  family  support  in  Hungary
22.  Generally, 
parents of children aged 16 and under receive a fixed monthly allowance to help them 
cover  the  expenses  associated  with  childrearing.  The  regulations  concerning  family 
allowance  changed  frequently,  but  these  changes  generally  meant  its  expansion
23 
(Jarvis, Micklewright, 1995, Tárkányi 2001). Initially only granted to those employed 
in the state sector, all employees became entitled to receive the allowance after 1946. 
During the period of 1995–1998, an income test was in force; thereafter, it became 
universal. The size of the sum changed continuously, and it was usually based on the 
number of children (with preference shown to two and three children), and whether 
                                                            
21 We only touch upon crèches, kindergartens, and housing supports. We will not deal with medical 
institutions for children, allowances at the workplace for the care of an ill child, price supplement for goods 
consumed by children, school-visiting support, or social support.  
22 A family allowance was introduced in public administration in 1912. In the 1930s, different private firms 
and sections of chambers of commerce introduced different kind of family allowances, which were 
standardised nationwide in 1938 (Tárkányi, 2001).  
23 Family allowance was granted for hardly more than half of the children in 1950, and for the great majority 
(more than nine-tenths) of them from the 1980s onwards. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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parents were single. The allowance per one child/average wage ratio was 5.2% in 1965, 
10.4% in 1975, 13.6% in 1985, 13.7% in 1995, and 7.8% in 2003 (Gábos, 2005:173)
24. 
As mentioned earlier, in February 1953, the Ministry of Health enacted explicitly 
pronatalist  measures,  which  were,  for  the  most  part,  prohibitive,  restrictive,  and 
sometimes drastic. The requirements for induced abortion were drastically increased, 
access  to  contraceptive  devices  was  severely  restricted,  and  the  reporting  and 
registration  of  pregnancies  were  made  compulsory.  At  the  same  time,  some 
supplementary  measures  eased  the  conditions  of  childbearing:  maternity  wards  at 
hospitals were expanded, a higher proportion of births were carried out in hospitals, and 
the networks of crèches and kindergartens were developed (Miltényi 1992). The severe 
conditions placed on induced abortion were abolished in 1956. 
One of the most generous parental leave schemes in Europe was established in 
1967, when the childcare allowance (known as GYES) was introduced as a reaction to 
the uniquely low fertility level in Hungary in the 1960s. Mothers who were employed 
previously
25 could stay at home for up to two and a half years (30 months)
26 to care for 
their children. During the period of the parental leave, mothers receive a fixed amount 
of allowance. When the childcare allowance was launched, its monthly amount was 
around 40% of the average female earnings, and it amounted to approximately 26% of 
the  monthly  average  net  earnings  of  women  in  2006.  After  the  expiration  of  the 
childcare allowance, the employer had to re-employ the mother in her former position. 
It worked well during state socialism; however, this rule functions only to a limited 
extent under the new market economy conditions. Since 1982, fathers have also been 
eligible  to  make  use  of  GYES  after  the  first  birthday  of  the  child;  however  only 
negligible percentage of them utilize this option. GYES became means-tested during 
the period 1996–1998, and then universally available, without any limitations. 
In 1973, a complex population policy programme was introduced, which contained 
demographic objectives designed to assure population replacement, to counteract the 
aging of the population, and to create a stable demographic situation. This principally 
meant  the  increase  in  the  real  value  of  the  already  existing  allowances  (family 
allowance, child-care allowance) and the introduction of special housing support. Thus, 
families with three or more children were given council (state-owned) flats with low 
rent within a relative short period, and the newly wed received loans with low interest, 
or free of interest. Moreover, a considerable amount of non-refundable social policy 
housing support was provided for “promised children.” Some restrictive measures were 
                                                            
24 Average allowance calculation is based on state budget expenditure. 
25 The employment criterion was continuously changing. To provide a couple of early examples: in 1967, 
GYES was only provided for full-time employed mothers who worked continuously for at least 12 months 
before giving birth. In 1969, former students were eligible for GYES after only three months of employment; 
in addition, lone fathers also became eligible.  
26 Since 1969, 36 months. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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also introduced regarding permission for induced abortions, though it was emphasised 
that the restrictions were aimed at encouraging contraception. The re-regulation was 
quite  liberal,  since  fewer  than  1%  of  the  requests  were  rejected.  Parallel  to  the 
programme’s  implementation,  the  range  of  effective  contraceptive  devices  was 
expanded, and access to contraception was simplified.  
The new parental leave scheme, the wage-related childcare fee, or GYED, was 
also  introduced  as  a  reaction  to  the  demographic  processes  at  the  beginning  of  the 
1980s. Fertility fell below replacement level again, life expectancy declined owing to 
unfavourable  mortality  conditions,  and  the  decrease  in  population,  which  is  still  in 
progress, had begun. The new population policy concept aimed to moderate and then 
stop population decline together, while achieving a more balanced population structure. 
In order to reach these objectives, the increase of fertility, the lowering of mortality, and 
the strengthening of the role of families were designated as equal tasks. Mothers with 
previous employment could make use of the childcare fee (GYED), a wage-related 
support, until the child reaches age two. During this time, mothers received 75% (in 
cases of shorter employment, 65%) of the previous average wage (see Tárkányi 2001). 
The childcare fee was suspended between 1996 and 1999, and was re-introduced in 
2000, but with a ceiling equal to two times the actual monthly minimum wage. (In 
2006, the minimum wage was HUF 62,500, or about EUR 250). During the first 24–36 
months  of  the  child’s  life,  the  flat-rate  GYES  was  available  for  mothers.  After 
termination of GYED (as in case of GYES), the right to return to the former job was 
secure.  
The system of personal income tax was introduced in 1988. In order to reduce the 
financial burden on families with children, a tax deduction (tax refund) was allowed in 
case of taxable income.
27 The tax deduction was somewhat higher for the third and 
higher order children than for the first and second child. During the 1995–1999 period, 
the tax reduction was terminated. After the re-introduction in 1999, the tax deduction 
after three or more children increased markedly. 
The crèche and kindergarten system expanded in accordance with the demand of 
increasing  female  employment.  Some  7.4%  of  children  between  0–2  years  of  age 
attended crèches in 1960; the corresponding figure was 9.5% in 1970, 14.8% in 1980, 
and 11.7% around the time of the change of political regime. Since the majority (four-
fifths) of children going to crèche are two years old, 35%–50% of two-year-olds went 
to  a  crèche  in  the  1980s.  Similar  trends  are  seen  at  kindergartens.  Attendance  at 
kindergarten among 3–5-year-old children was understandably higher. In 1970, 57.7% 
of  children  went  to  kindergarten;  in  1980,  79.8%  attended;  and  in  1990,  87.1% 
attended. Subsequently, their ratio has grown even further: presently, more than nine 
out of ten children aged 3–5 go to kindergarten.  
                                                            
27 There was no negative tax in case of no taxable income. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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While  population  policy  measures  before  1990  were  characterised  by  the 
expansion  and  enrichment  of  provision  types,  population  policy  was  basically 
zigzagging in the 15 years following the change of political regime in 1989/1990, and it 
often became the key issue of political struggles (Gábos, 2005; Ignits, Kapitány, 2006). 
Changes affected not only the real value of different provisions; the entitlement criteria 
were also often modified. 
The first freely elected Antall government (1990–1994), which was conservative, 
viewed demography as a strategic objective: not only did it preserve the former system 
of institutions, but one of its first measures was a significant raise in the amount of 
family allowance. In addition, the government granted the childcare allowance as a 
universal  right.  In  1992,  the  entitlement  for  a  tax  reduction  that  was  based  on  the 
number of children was extended to families with one or two children. We may regard 
the introduction of the system of childrearing support in 1993 as a form of advocacy 
for the conservative family model, since it basically meant a kind of institutionalisation 
of “full-time motherhood”. Parents, including adoptive or foster parents, or guardians 
with three or more minor children living in their household became entitled to this 
provision. Childrearing support is given from the time the youngest child turns three 
until when he/she turns eight. The monthly amount is equivalent to the lowest amount 
of old-age pension (in 2006, it was HUF 26,830, or approximately EUR 107).  
The  second  (socialist)  Horn  government  introduced  basic  financial  restrictions. 
The so-called ‘Bokros Package’ of 1995 completely restructured basic family programs: 
lower income status became the criterion for receiving provisions; means-testing came 
into force in cases of family allowance and childcare allowance (GYES). The wage-
related childcare fee (GYED) and tax deduction for children were abolished. In other 
words,  the  explicit  aim  of  politics  between  1995  and  1998  was  to  reduce  the 
childbearing expenses of parents only in disadvantageous financial situations.  
The third (conservative) Orbán government regarded demographic issues as being 
of a strategic importance, and it explicitly included population and family issues in its 
political programme. It reacted in a particularly responsive  way to the considerable 
decrease in the number of births that started in 1992. As a first step, it redefined the 
eligibility criteria: provisions that had previously been linked to an income limit became 
universal. It also re-established the wage-related childcare fee (GYED), and introduced 
a large-scale system of family tax allowance (tax deduction), mainly favouring families 
with three or more children.  
Under the socialist party government since 2002, the system of family provisions 
constantly stood at the centre of debates; however, major changes only took place in the 
field of tax allowances: the availability of tax deductions for children was restricted, 
and only parents with three or more children, or those with incomes below a certain 
limit became eligible. Family allowance was significantly raised. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Although the capacity of kindergartens and crèches decreased after the change of 
regime, particularly among those run by employers, kindergarten and crèche services 
did not shrink significantly, and the rate of children attending kindergarten between the 
ages of 3–5 even increased to 92%. 
In  summary,  we  may  conclude  that  a  significant  fluctuation  characterised 
Hungarian family policy after 1990; the basic principles of support changed often and 
profoundly.  Moreover,  the  real  value  of  provisions  repeatedly  decreased  during  the 
1990s, a period characterised by high inflation. Therefore, family policy and levels of 
child-related supports were highly unpredictable. At the same time, it is important to 
emphasise that former institutions that had been intended as parts of population policy 
were  not  terminated,  and  they  were  not  completely  turned  into  social  policy  tools 
(except for the period between 1995 and 1998). The present-day family policy includes 
equally provisions that are universal, employment- or wage-related, and income-related. 
 
 
7.2 Evaluation and demographic effects of population policy measures 
It is a general assumption in Hungary that population policy measures have failed to 
reach their objectives, or have done so only within narrow limits. The decline of fertility 
halted only temporarily, and then resumed again following the policy changes during 
state  socialism.  Contrary  to  the  political  objectives,  replacement-level  fertility  was 
reached or exceeded only for four years over the past four decades. The criticism that 
population policy measures were inefficient and only affected timing of childbearing 
may be questioned given the longer-term trends of completed fertility. The level of 
completed fertility continuously decreased among generations born in the first part of 
the past century, and it reached its minimum in cohorts born at the beginning of the 
1940s, with 187 children per 100 women. This also means that the strict ban on induced 
abortions at the beginning of the 1950s, which caused the short-lived but significant rise 
in period fertility, had absolutely no effect on the declining trend in completed fertility. 
On the contrary, all the cohorts born between 1944 and 1966 reached higher numbers of 
children – between 190 and 198 – than the earlier cohorts by the time of their completed 
fertility (cf Figure 1). These generations started to have children from the mid-1960s, 
and, upon reaching childbearing age, they could firmly rely on provisions that were 
introduced  between  1967  and  1993.  However,  we  cannot  accurately  analyse  the 
contribution  of  all  of  the  above  measures  to  the  ending  of  the  declining  trend  in 
completed fertility, and its subsequent slow but continuous rise. 
Concerning the period after 1990, fertility behaviour seems to be “insensitive” to 
the above-mentioned, constantly changing measures. The declining tendency of fertility 
appears to be long-lasting, and we cannot find ruptures related to policy changes. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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In the following paragraphs, we present some research results which suggest that 
population policy measures were not completely ineffective.  
Andorka  demonstrates  the  possible  effects  of  population  policy  through  the 
analysis of census data broken down by education level (Andorka, 1987, p. 287ff). 
According to the results, the childbearing propensity of married women decreased at 
each qualification level until 1970 (number of children per 100 married women in given 
age groups). This trend, however, came to an end between 1970 and 1980 (see Table 6). 
The number of children per 100 married women grew by 13 children at ages 25–29, and 
by four at ages 30–34. The increase was particularly dynamic among highly educated 
women with completed secondary school, college, or university degrees: the number of 
live  births  per  100  women  rose  by  29  among  women  aged  25–29  with  completed 
secondary school, by 19 among women with completed higher education, and by 26 
among women aged 30–34 with both secondary and tertiary level education. According 
to Andorka, this increase can be considered the result of population policy measures 
(increasing the real value of childcare allowance, housing support) introduced in 1973. 
The fertility increase at all education levels was able to compensate for the composition 
effect  caused  by  the  increasing  education  level  of  women,  and  could  thus  stop  the 
general tendency of fertility decline. We completed Andorka’s data with the data from 
the census of 1990, and the results showed that policy measures introduced in the 1980s 
also led to a further small increase in fertility.
28 Andorka summarises as follows: “The 
effect of population policy is primarily manifested in its possible role in the second 
births in most families with one child…This could slightly compensate the declining 
practice of families with more children, caused by modernisation.” (ibida 293). 
Gábos  and  Gál  investigated  the  fertility  effect  of  all  types  of  family  support 
granted  in  cash  in  the  period  of  1950–2000  through  an  econometric  analysis  (Gál, 
Gábos, 2004, Gábos, 2005). Their dependent variable was the annual change of total 
fertility  rate  (TFR),  and  their  independent  variables  included  the  change  of  family 
support in cash in the previous year. Based on their analyses, they concluded that a 10% 
increase (from year t–1 to year t) in the value of family support in relation to the net real 
income brings a rise in the total fertility rate of approximately 2.5% from year t to year 
t+1 (Gál, Gábos: 172 p). According to Gábos, the effect is stronger in Hungary than in 
Western European countries; in other words, the Hungarian population of fertile age 
“reacted”  more  flexibly  to  the  policy  changes  in  the  real  value  of  family  supports 
granted in cash. 
 
                                                            
28 We cannot take the same data of the census of 2001 into consideration, since the share of extramarital births 
had significantly increased and the prevalence of marriages had fallen considerably by then. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Table 6:  Number of live births per 100 married women by selected age and  
  education level groups, 1960–1990  
 
Age of married  Completed education of  1960  1970  1980  1990 
25–29 years           
  Incomplete primary (6–7 years)  171  183  238  276 
  Completed primary (8 years)  148  147  178  – 
  Completed secondary  111  108  137  141 
  University or college degree  94  93  112  115 
  Total  161  145  158  157 
30–34 years           
  Incomplete primary (6–7 years)  211  205  258  294 
  Completed primary (8 years)  174  174  200  – 
  Completed secondary  150  139  165  174 
  University or college degree  135  133  159  166 
  Total  200  184  188  191 
 
Source: Andorka, 1987: p.326, KSH, 2006b: p. 65–67. 
 
 
Our  analyses  regarding  the  period  after  the  change  of  political  regime 
demonstrated  that  measures  between  1995  and  1998  had  two  types  of  fertility 
consequences (Aassve et al. 2006). On the one hand, we could show a clear negative 
period effect on fertility, but only for 1996–1998. According to our interpretation, the 
restriction  of  family  supports  unambiguously  affected  childbearing  propensity  in  a 
negative way. On the other hand, we could also prove a composition effect regarding 
the period in question: the decline of childbearing propensity among those with higher 
education  levels  was  significantly  greater  than  among  those  with  lower  levels  of 
education. These results are in accord with expectations, since the abolishment of wage-
related supports and linking the remaining flat-rate supports to income level affected 
people with middle- and higher-level education negatively, and people with very low 
levels of education positively.  
Recently  Kapitány  (2008)  using  econometric  methods  tried  to  measure  the 
potential effect of the childcare fee (GYED) for the period 1986–1995, when it was in 
force. According to his estimation, this program increased the number of live births 
about 8.7% during the whole period.  
The above results are only based on the analysis of selected measures; still, we can 
conclude that the effect of family support on fertility was not negligible. That is to say, 
we cannot state that family support was entirely ineffective. At the same time, the effect 
of different types of policy measures on total fertility (period and completed), and on 
the fertility of particular social groups, requires further analysis. Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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8. Phases of transformation. An attempt to segment fertility 
development in Hungary  
As a summary, we attempt to break down into phases the period of Hungarian fertility 
discussed  above,  and  describe  the  important  elements  that  have  shaped  fertility 
behaviour in each of the periods. This division is largely subjective, but it is based on 
the systematisation of available data and information, and it is also hypothetical insofar 
as it is not explicitly derived from empirical analyses. Table 7 facilitates orientation in 
our periodisation of fertility changes, where important events are indicated in relation to 
the time axis, according to the previously mentioned aspects. 
 
 
8.1   1967–1985: The period of active population policy  
The  bottoming  out  of  fertility  did  not  occur  independently  of  the  policies  of  the 
totalitarian state, which carried out forced modernisation, extensive industrialisation, 
and forced  mobility in the 1950s. It became obvious that the rapid “absorption” of 
women into labour market and their employment far away from their birth places
29 at 
low wages did not make the reconciliation of work and family possible; therefore, the 
establishment  of  crèches  and  kindergartens  was  inevitable.  The  introduction  of 
childcare allowance in 1967 served multiple purposes. On the one hand, it replaced the 
construction of new crèches (it was actually less expensive to keep the potential labour 
force at home); while, on the other hand, it provided the provisional “release” from 
forced female employment that was often regarded as a pressure, since the mother could 
legitimately stay at home a relatively long period of time. Moreover, it also permitted 
the mother to return to her job easily. Fertility increase was only short-lived, and it 
entailed further, even more extensive governmental interventions (increasing the real 
value of provisions, a programme for obtaining housing, and the introduction of the 
childcare  fee).  Therefore,  Andorka  calls  this  stage  the  “period  of  active  population 
policy” (Andorka, 1987). The decline of fertility slowed down, and completed fertility 
stabilised. Marriage  was almost universal. This era  was characterised by the family 
model of “early marriage, and an early birth of (two) children” (Frejka, 1980). The 
family  was important  for everyone, since it represented  a sphere of freedom in the 
centrally  organised  and  controlled  system,  and  it  provided  a  “refuge”  from  the 
incalculability of the formal world (Andorka, 1997, Somlai, 1997). 
Some phenomena can be experienced that do not fit in the above reproduction 
pattern. The spread of divorces started early, which, studies have suggested, may have 
                                                            
29 This employment relocation made it impossible to use the care provided by the family, especially the grandparents. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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been  due  to  the  forced  industrialisation,  the  expansion  of  female  employment,  and 
spatial mobility (detachment from the original milieu; Lıcsei 1971). The high divorce 
rate eroded the value of marriage and paved the way for the spread of cohabitation, both 
in its wider acceptance and in its wide adoption among divorced and separated couples 
(Carlson, Klinger, 1987). 
 
 
8.2   1985–1990: incubation of the alternative family mode(s)  
In the 1980s, gradual changes in economic and social reproduction were underway. The 
indebtedness of the country revealed the ineffective and wasteful operation of the state 
socialist  economy.  The  performance  of  the  economy  decreased,  the  construction  of 
houses declined, and the financing of community provisions (e.g., participation in the 
financing of kindergartens) was increasingly imposed on families. Due to numerous 
factors  (the  customer-orientation  of  economic  policy,  the  relative  openness  of  the 
country),  ‘Western-style’  value  orientations  became  widespread  by  the  1980s  in 
Hungary (see Hankiss, 1982). As we have indicated earlier, we suppose that values 
facilitating or requiring the new fertility practice were already “at hand” prior to the 
change of regime: the high number of divorces, the spread of cohabitations, the high 
extent  of  secularisation,  a  raw  form  of  individualisation,  the  tensions  between 
employment and childrearing, and patterns of consumption and childbearing all allude 
to this process. However, family support programmes, introduced in the 1970s and the 
1980s, strengthened the pattern of early childbearing. The introduction of the childcare 
fee in 1985 and the social policy housing support that facilitated housing construction 
tried  to  consolidate  the  reproductive  regime;  it  created  quite  a  strong  (financial) 
motivation for early childbearing, especially for people in the middle social strata. 
 
 
8.3   1990–1995: the period of institutional vacuum and anomie  
The change of political regime implied total reconstruction and “replacement” of 
the system of institutions within a short period of time. It created a completely new 
environment for everyday actions, and the criteria for beneficial and disadvantageous 
social  practices  were  also  redefined.  Obviously,  the  change  of  the  political  regime 
demolished the walls (institutions) that restrained the values emerging in the 1980s. 
These values have certainly shaped demographic behaviour since the political regime 
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Table 7:  Changes in demography, social structure, mentality,  
  and politics between 1965 and 2005 that are relevant 
  to pattern change 
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transition and continue to shape it also today. Certain demographic behaviours, such as 
cohabitation,  started  to  spread  rapidly  on  the  “ruins”  of  the  collapsing  system  of 
institutions, and, at the same time, fertility trends changed only slowly, and the decline 
in TFR continued in the mid-1990s. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 18 
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Table 7:  (Continued)  Changes in demography, social structure, 
  mentality,and politics between 1965 and 2005 that are relevant  
  to pattern change 
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Contradictory factors had influenced fertility behaviour. On the one hand, the first 
free  conservative  government  left  the  family  support  system  intact;  moreover,  it 
reinforced it with the introduction of the childrearing support in 1993, and maintained 
the real value of family support. These changes signalled to many people involved that Spéder & Kamarás: Hungary: Secular fertility decline with distinct period fluctuations 
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childbearing  would  be  in  line  with  the  previous  practice.  On  the  other  hand, 
“competing”  life  objectives  emerged  instantaneously:  consumer  supply  expanded 
rapidly and drastically, and “travelling” as the central practice of the pleasure society 
(“Erlebnisgesellschaft”) became the objects of desire. It is obvious that the pursuit of 
these objectives motivates people to postpone childbearing. 
According to Merton’s action theory, social anomie is characteristic during periods 
when the institutional system radically changes and transformations are comprehensive. 
This is fundamentally characterised by the mismatch of values, prescriptions, and the 
ways of achieving values (Merton, 1980).
30 During the period of anomie, insecurity is 
frequent,  once  non-conformist  behaviour  (innovation,  retreatism,  rebellion)  spreads, 
since the majority of people have not found the new modus vivendi. Also, a reversion to 
ritualism,  and  the  maintenance  of  formerly  well-functioning  practices  could  be 
preferred. Within the field of family formation, cohabitation is closer to innovation, 
while  (transitory)  giving  up  on  marriage,  partnership,  and  children  can  be  seen  as 
retreatism.  However,  notable  segments  of  society  may  adapt  by  “insisting”  on  the 
previous practice (ritualism) during the period of new insecurity. They may feel that 
“childbearing has always been a part of life; it will not be otherwise even under the new 
circumstances.” 
Based on the existence of the above contradictory circumstances, we can regard 
the period after the change of political regime as the age of “anomie and institutional 
vacuum.” At this time, we assume that two childbearing practices existed parallel to 
each other: insisting on the previous practice (= the mean age at first child does not 
increase) and retreatism (giving up childbearing “provisionally”).  
 
 
8.4   1995–    : Pattern change: adaptation to new social circumstances  
Although the establishment of new systems of institutions was rapid, it nonetheless took 
time, and members of society needed time to adapt to the changes. The disequilibrium 
on the labour market took place by the mid-1990s: there were fewer job opportunities, 
one had to work more intensively, and competition became fierce. Households faced 
continuously tight budgetary limits: even if the product to be consumed was “within 
reach,” the resources to purchase it were not sufficient. Subsequent to the privatisation 
of the housing market, families needed greater financial resources than before to enter 
this  market.  Unemployment  became  an  everyday  phenomenon;  the  real  value  of 
unemployment benefits constantly decreased from the open-handed beginnings. 
New opportunities appeared: the earnings of the young approached those of the 
old,  and  the  seniority-related  earnings  slope  was  moderated.  Educational  expansion 
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continued: within a few years, the number of students participating in higher education 
tripled. Higher education represented both a pressure and an opportunity,  while  not 
participating meant the prolongation of disadvantageous position. 
At the same time, a sharp change took place in the welfare system, and it primarily 
affected family policy. The ‘Bokros Package’(1995) linked universal family provisions 
to income level, and it abolished wage-related allowances. It marked the onset of the 
period of “push and pull” population policy. The consecutive Orbán-government re-
established  previous  institutions  (1998);  however,  family  allowances  were  constant 
targets of political attacks. These frequent changes led people to conclude that family 
policy was unpredictable and family allowances might not be relied upon in the long 
run.  
Opportunities and constraints shape the segmentation of the life course into phases. 
The  place  of  childbearing  within  the  life  course  was  also  altered:  it  is  “due”  after 
education is finished, or more likely after getting a secure job. Unless these conditions 
are  met,  new  parents  may  find  themselves  in  disadvantageous  positions  given  the 
competition of the labour market, consumption opportunities, and struggle for social 
status. Stable partnership certainly remains a prerequisite for parenthood; however, at 
the same time, the instability of partnerships, first unions and especially cohabitations, 
is increasing. Therefore, childbearing is postponed to a later and later point in the life 
course, and, meanwhile, it is differentiated: (presumably) there will be more people 
with no child or with only one child, in part due to the ever later start of childbearing. 
At the same time, the low, but not insignificant ratio of families with three or more 
children is not decreasing. A considerable and still increasing percentage of children are 
born  out  of  wedlock.  Values  play  a  crucial  role  in  this  differentiation  of  fertility 
behaviour: people with less individualised values, people preferring traditional gender 
roles, women adhering to religion, and men with an optimistic life orientation and good 
future expectations are more likely to have children.  
The evolution of the new childbearing practice has not been completed yet, and 
pattern  change  cannot  be  regarded  as  finished,  since  the  simplest  indicator  of  the 
transformation  of  fertility  patterns,  the  mean  age  at  first  birth,  is  still  increasing. 
However, we can be sure that later childbearing will not be the only difference between 
the old pattern of the 1970s and the 1980s, and the new pattern. The partnership context 
of childbearing will surely be new since the exclusivity of marriage has ended, and the 
social status differentiation in the number of children will be greater. 
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